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INTRODUCTION 
Several different tests have been proposed to determine whether a state 
practice violates the Establishment Clause, including the Lemon test, the 
endorsement test, and the coercion test.  While no test yet commands the 
consistent support of members of the Court, it is clear that several members of 
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the Court favor some version of the coercion test.  Interpretation and 
evaluation of that test are rather difficult, however, because Court members 
differ greatly both about what kind of coercion triggers the relevant protections 
and about what the test is designed to prevent.  As described by Justice 
Kennedy, the test might preclude a whole range of practices that would result 
in an individual being psychologically pressured against her will to participate 
in or to attend a state-sponsored event in which a religious ceremony takes 
place, while the test described by Justices Scalia and Thomas would preclude 
substantially less.  The great disparity in views both about the reach and the 
proper application of the coercion test has caused utter confusion in the lower 
courts—courts have reached diametrically opposed conclusions about the 
constitutionality of relevantly similar school setting practices. 
Part I of this Article discusses pre-Lee v. Weisman1 cases in which 
different Justices discuss whether or in what ways coercion must be shown to 
support a finding that the Establishment Clause has been violated.  Part II 
discusses Lee, the case in which the test was adopted, and applications of Lee 
in some of the circuits.  Part III discusses Santa Fe Independent School District 
v. Doe,2 where the Court applied and possibly refined the coercion test, and 
application of that possible refinement in the circuits.  The Article concludes 
by highlighting some of the ways in which the Court’s jurisprudence has 
created unnecessary difficulty and confusion and by noting that until members 
of the Court can reach much more of a consensus about what the coercion test 
is designed to prevent and what kind of coercion is constitutionally proscribed, 
the chaos and confusion in the jurisprudence and in the lower courts will only 
increase. 
I.  COERCION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The Supreme Court long ago explained that a state practice might violate 
Establishment Clause guarantees even absent a showing of direct state 
coercion.  However, members of the Court have very different understandings 
of the relationship between coercion and Establishment Clause guarantees, 
both with respect to whether the existence of coercion is a necessary rather 
than a sufficient condition to trigger Establishment Clause guarantees and even 
with respect to the kind of coercion that is relevant for constitutional purposes.  
With those disagreements remaining unresolved, it is no wonder that the 
jurisprudence preceding Lee provided no clear analysis regarding the 
relationship between coercion and Establishment Clause guarantees. 
 
 1. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 2. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
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A. Engel’s Rejection of the Need to Show Coercion? 
Almost fifty years ago, the Court in Engel v. Vitale discussed whether a 
state practice might violate Establishment Clause guarantees even absent a 
showing of state coercion.3  The Court made clear that it could, although there 
has been some debate about whether the Court was merely suggesting that 
Establishment Clause protections could be triggered even absent direct state 
coercion or, instead, was suggesting that such protections could be triggered 
absent any state coercion at all. 
At issue in Engel was the required daily recitation in New York public 
schools of a non-denominational prayer composed by the regents themselves.4  
The Court struck down the practice,5 noting that “the constitutional prohibition 
against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in 
this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official 
prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious 
program carried on by government.”6  Yet, the Constitution’s prohibiting states 
from composing official prayers to be recited at state functions does not 
impose much of a limitation on the states, and the important issue for purposes 
of understanding the coercion test involves determining what else Engel and 
other cases have to say about the constraints imposed by the Establishment 
Clause.7 
Suppose that the state had not composed the prayer but, instead, had 
merely encouraged the daily recitation of a nondenominational prayer in the 
classroom.8  Even so, the Engel Court suggested that the state would have been 
 
 3. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 4. Id. at 422. 
The respondent Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 9, New Hyde Park, 
New York, acting in its official capacity under state law, directed the School District’s 
principal to cause the following prayer to be said aloud by each class in the presence of a 
teacher at the beginning of each school day: “Almighty God, we acknowledge our 
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and 
our Country.” 
Id. 
 5. Id. at 424 (“We think that by using its public school system to encourage recitation of the 
Regents’ prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the 
Establishment Clause.”). 
 6. Id. at 425. 
 7. The Establishment Clause has been incorporated against the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (“The First 
Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, commands that a state ‘shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’” 
(citing Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943))). 
 8. Cf. Engel, 370 U.S. at 436 (“It is true that New York’s establishment of its Regents’ 
prayer as an officially approved religious doctrine of that State does not amount to a total 
establishment of one particular religious sect to the exclusion of all others.”). 
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overstepping the limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause,9 explaining 
that “government in this country, be it state or federal, is without power to 
prescribe by law any particular form of prayer which is to be used as an official 
prayer in carrying on any program of governmentally sponsored religious 
activity.”10  Thus, the Court suggested, the state would not have been allowed 
to require the recitation of a prayer at a state-sponsored event, even had the 
prayer been composed by a private citizen rather than the regents, themselves. 
The difficulty with the New York program was not that students were 
being forced to recite the prayer or even to remain in the room while it was 
recited, since they had the option of absenting themselves from the room while 
the prayer was being recited.11  The Engel Court explained that the 
Establishment Clause “does not depend upon any showing of direct 
governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which 
establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce 
nonobserving individuals or not.”12  Yet, merely because direct governmental 
compulsion need not be shown does not mean that Establishment Clause 
guarantees can be violated even absent a showing of any compulsion at all.  
Instead, the Engel Court may merely have meant that although it is necessary 
to show some sort of governmental compulsion, a showing of indirect 
compulsion will suffice. 
The New York practice imposed some pressure on the students to 
participate: “When the power, prestige and financial support of government is 
placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon 
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is 
plain.”13  By requiring the recitation of a prayer, the state placed non-adherents 
in a difficult position—either they could leave and risk the potentially adverse 
consequences that might result from refusing to remain in the room while the 
prayer was recited, e.g., ostracism by peers, or they could remain in the room 
and be forced to confront the fact that their religious beliefs did not coincide 
with those endorsed by the state.  Yet, after noting that the New York program 
indirectly coerced students to accept prevailing religious views, the Court 
failed to explain whether that coercion was necessary or, instead, sufficient to 
show that constitutional guarantees had been violated. 
 
 9. Id. at 424 (“We think that by using its public school system to encourage recitation of the 
Regents’ prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the 
Establishment Clause.”). 
 10. Id. at 430. 
 11. See id. ( “[T]he program, as modified and approved by state courts, does not require all 
pupils to recite the prayer but permits those who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused 
from the room . . . .”). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431. 
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The Engel Court’s discussion of the purposes behind the Establishment 
Clause might be interpreted to support either of two competing positions: (1) 
the State cannot be shown to have violated Establishment Clause guarantees 
unless there is proof of at least indirect coercion, or (2) the State may be shown 
to have violated Establishment Clause guarantees even absent proof of either 
direct or indirect coercion.  For example, after suggesting that one of the goals 
of the Establishment Clause was to prevent the imposition of this indirect 
pressure on non-adherents, the Court explained that “the purposes underlying 
the Establishment Clause go much further than that.”14  But the Court did not 
make clear whether those further purposes were totally divorced from 
preventing religious coercion or, instead, could all be understood in terms of 
the negative effects associated with forcing individuals to subscribe to 
religious orthodoxy. 
Consider the point that the Clause’s “first and most immediate purpose 
rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy 
government and to degrade religion,”15 because “whenever government . . . 
allie[s] itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result  [is] that 
it incur[s] the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those [holding] contrary 
beliefs.”16  It is simply unclear whether these feelings of contempt and 
disrespect arise from the mere fact that the state has endorsed particular 
religious views or, instead, from the state’s imposing pressure on its citizens to 
adopt those views.  By the same token, the Founders’ “awareness of the 
historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious 
persecutions go hand in hand”17 speaks to a recognition that the government 
endorsement of religion can lead to state pressure to adhere to religious 
orthodoxy.  But if the result to be avoided is religious persecution and not 
government endorsement of particular religious views per se, then the 
Constitution’s precluding both direct and indirect coercion would seem to do 
all of the necessary work to achieve the desired goal. 
Nonetheless, the Engel Court implied that the Establishment Clause was 
designed to do more than prevent governmental coercion.  When suggesting 
that “government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or 
sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the 
people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious 
guidance,”18 the Court was not solely focused on coercion.  Rather, it was 
suggesting that the Constitution reserves religious functions for the people or, 
perhaps, members of the clergy, and that the state is simply not to get involved 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 432. 
 18. Engel, 370 U.S. at 435. 
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in religion, much less coerce people to adopt or reject particular religious 
views. 
It might seem that the danger posed by the short, nondenominational 
prayer at issue in Engel was so trivial as to pose no real danger.  Yet that view 
was rejected, because the Court feared that permitting this incursion on 
religious liberty might permit much more serous incursions in the future.19  
Still, it was unclear what kind of incursions the Court was envisioning—more 
coercive measures, e.g., the imposition of sanctions on those who were 
unwilling to recite a nondenominational prayer, or more sectarian, albeit non-
coercive practices, e.g., state-sponsored prayers invoking the name of a 
particular religious figure.20 
After focusing on the coercive aspect of the practice at issue, Justice 
Douglas noted that a variety of other state practices imposed that same sort of 
indirect religious coercion: 
It is said that the element of coercion is inherent in the giving of this prayer.  If 
that is true here, it is also true of the prayer with which this Court is convened, 
and of those that open the Congress.  Few adults, let alone children, would 
leave our courtroom or the Senate or the House while those prayers are being 
given.  Every such audience is in a sense a “captive” audience.21 
When making this point, he was arguing that all of these practices 
offended constitutional guarantees.22  His point at least suggests that in many 
cases involving alleged violations of Establishment Clause guarantees, the 
 
 19. See id. at 436. 
To those who may subscribe to the view that because the Regents’ official prayer is so 
brief and general there can be no danger to religious freedom in its governmental 
establishment, however, it may be appropriate to say in the words of James Madison, the 
author of the First Amendment: “(I)t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our 
liberties. . . . Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in 
exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of 
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?  That the same authority which can force a 
citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one 
establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases 
whatsoever?” 
Id. (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 185–86 (Gaillard Hunt Ed., (1900)). 
 20. Cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 42 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“The Pledge . . . does not refer to a nation ‘under Jesus’ or ‘under Vishnu,’ but 
instead acknowledges religion in a general way: a simple reference to a generic ‘God.’”); 
McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 897 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“All of the actions 
of Washington and the First Congress upon which I have relied, virtually all Thanksgiving 
Proclamations throughout our history, and all the other examples of our Government’s favoring 
religion that I have cited, have invoked God, but not Jesus Christ.”). 
 21. Engel, 370 U.S. at 441–42 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 22. Id. at 437 (“I think it is an unconstitutional undertaking whatever form it takes.”). 
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requirement that there be proof of indirect coercion may not pose much of a 
bar.23  If indirect coercion is interpreted rather broadly and, for example, 
occurs whenever religious activities take place at state-sponsored events, the 
relevant question in many cases will not be whether there was indirect coercion 
but, instead, whether something in addition to coercion must be shown in order 
for the Court to find that Establishment Clause guarantees have been violated. 
Given that the state itself had composed the prayer for which daily 
recitation in the public schools was mandated, there were several different 
bases upon which the Engel Court could rest the practice’s unconstitutionality.  
That said, it should not be thought that the Engel decision was unanimous.  In 
his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart not only suggested that permitting but 
not requiring students to pray did not constitute an establishment of religion, 
but also suggested that denying “the wish of these school children to join in 
reciting this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual 
heritage of our Nation.”24  Justice Stewart thereby foreshadowed a different 
argument that would be offered with some frequency in the context of prayer 
in schools, namely, that some students fervently wish to have such prayers and 
that by denying those students such an opportunity the state seemed to be 
denying them something that they valued rather highly.25 
B. Schempp on Coercion 
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,26 the Court 
considered the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania law requiring the reading of 
Bible verses at the beginning of each school day.27  As was true in Engel, the 
law at issue in Schempp provided that children could be excused from the 
reading.28  As was also true in Engel, the Court struck down the law as a 
 
 23. Justice Douglas may have been using a different albeit related criterion of 
unconstitutionality. See id. (“The point for decision is whether the Government can 
constitutionally finance a religious exercise.  Our system at the federal and state levels is 
presently honeycombed with such financing.  Nevertheless, I think it is an unconstitutional 
undertaking whatever form it takes.”). 
 24. Id. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 25. Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Religious men and women of almost all denominations have felt it necessary to 
acknowledge and beseech the blessing of God as a people, and not just as individuals, 
because they believe in the “protection of divine Providence,” as the Declaration of 
Independence put it, not just for individuals but for societies; because they believe God to 
be, as Washington’s first Thanksgiving Proclamation put it, the “Great Lord and Ruler of 
Nations.” 
Id. 
 26. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 27. Id. at 205. 
 28. See id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
424 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:417 
violation of religious guarantees.29  The Schempp Court reaffirmed that it was 
not necessary to make a showing of coercion under the Establishment Clause, 
noting that the “distinction between the two [Religion] clauses is apparent—a 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the 
Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended.”30 
It might seem that by unequivocally stating that coercion was not an 
element of Establishment Clause analysis, the Schempp Court made clear what 
the Engel Court had left uncertain.  Yet, one might argue that implicit in the 
Schempp discussion of coercion was the term “direct.”31  After all, pressure 
and coercion were discussed in Schempp, at least in that the Court mentioned 
that the father had not sought to have his children excused from these exercises 
because he had feared that his doing so would adversely affect his children’s 
relationships with their teachers and with the other students.32  Thus, Schempp 
might be thought compatible with an interpretation of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence suggesting that there must be at least indirect coercion in order 
for the relevant guarantees to be triggered.  However, such a reading would 
also imply a very relaxed standard for determining what would constitute 
indirect coercion, because the only coercion mentioned in Schempp is the 
possibility that students or teachers might react negatively were the children to 
absent themselves from the classroom during the daily prayer recitation. 
C. Wallace and the Coerciveness of Prayer 
Any discussion of the coerciveness of prayer in the classroom setting 
should include Wallace v. Jaffree,33 which involved a challenge to an Alabama 
statute authorizing “a period of silence ‘for meditation or voluntary prayer.’”34  
Ishmael Jaffree had challenged a Mobile County Public School practice of 
 
 29. See id. at 224. 
 30. See id. at 223; see also Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 
756, 786 (1973). 
The absence of any element of coercion, however, is irrelevant to questions arising under 
the Establishment Clause.  In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, . . . it 
was contended that Bible recitations in public schools did not violate the Establishment 
Clause because participation in such exercises was not coerced.  The Court rejected that 
argument, noting that while proof of coercion might provide a basis for a claim under the 
Free Exercise Clause, it was not a necessary element of any claim under the 
Establishment Clause. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 786 (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222–23). 
 31. Cf. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 660–
61 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“some of our recent cases 
reject the view that coercion is the sole touchstone of an Establishment Clause violation . . . 
[which] may be true if by ‘coercion’ is meant direct coercion . . . .”). 
 32. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 208. 
 33. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 34. Id. at 40. 
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maintaining regular religious prayer services, alleging that: “teachers had ‘on a 
daily’ basis led their classes in saying certain prayers in unison,”35 his children 
had been subjected to “various acts of religious indoctrination,”36 and his 
children had been “exposed to ostracism from their peer group class members 
if they did not participate.”37 
The Court struck down the law at issue because its enactment “was not 
motivated by any clearly secular purpose—indeed, the statute had no secular 
purpose.”38  Because the state already had a statute permitting meditation, the 
Court viewed the new statute, which permitted meditation or prayer, as an 
attempt to return prayer to the public schools.39 
Wallace is of interest, at least in part, because several members of the 
Court stated or implied that the constitutional difficulty was not prayer in 
school per se, but some of the other features of the case.40  For example, the 
Wallace Court distinguished what was before it from the state’s “merely 
protecting every student’s right to engage in voluntary prayer during an 
appropriate moment of silence during the schoolday.”41  The Court did not 
explore why a student praying during the moment of silence was permissible, 
although in her concurrence in the judgment Justice O’Connor offered several 
ways to distinguish between state-sponsored prayer and the state instituting a 
moment of silence during which students might pray or reflect.42 
She began her analysis by explaining how both Engel and Schempp might 
be understood in terms of indirect coercion by the State.  In both of those 
cases, “a student who did not share the religious beliefs expressed in the course 
of the exercise was left with the choice of participating, thereby compromising 
the nonadherent’s beliefs, or withdrawing, thereby calling attention to his or 
her nonconformity.”43  Justice O’Connor contrasted the constitutionally 
problematic scenarios presented in Engel and Schempp with a scenario where 
 
 35. Id. at 42. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56. 
 39. See id. at 59. 
 40. Id.; see also id. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring) (“I agree fully with Justice O’Connor’s 
assertion that some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional.”); Id. at 67 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“Nothing in the United States Constitution as interpreted by this 
Court or in the laws of the State of Alabama prohibits public school students from voluntarily 
praying at any time before, during, or after the schoolday.”). 
 41. Id. at 59. 
 42. Id. at 72 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 43. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 72 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).  But see Abner S. 
Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 456 (1995) (“In both 
Engel v. Vitale and Abington Township School District v. Schempp, the Court . . . answer[ed] 
question (b) with a clear ‘No’—proof of coercion is not necessary for an Establishment Clause 
claim.”). 
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the state has merely set aside a moment of silence during the day.  For 
example, “a moment of silence is not inherently religious,”44 since that time 
can be used for non-religious reflection or meditation.  Further, an individual 
taking part in a moment of silence need not thereby compromise her beliefs, 
because “a student who objects to prayer is left to his or her own thoughts, and 
is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of others.”45  For these 
kinds of reasons among others, Justice O’Connor believed that the state’s 
providing an opportunity for prayer during a moment of silence was 
constitutionally distinguishable from the state’s implementing a policy 
whereby prayers were periodically offered.46 
There is no small irony in Justice O’Connor’s having explicated Engel and 
Schempp in terms of state coercion.  In a subsequent opinion, in which Justice 
Kennedy suggested that the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence was 
best understood in terms of a coercion theory,47 Justice O’Connor implied that 
he had mischaracterized the jurisprudence.48  Yet, her characterization of Engel 
and Schempp makes Justice Kennedy’s analysis of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence much more plausible. 
D. The Indirect Coercion Theory of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
The first sustained defense of a coercion theory of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence was offered by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence and dissent in 
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union.49  At issue in 
Allegheny were two recurring holiday displays: (1) a crèche that was placed on 
the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse, and (2) a menorah 
placed next to both a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty outside of the 
City-County Building.50  The Court announced the test that it would use to 
determine whether the Establishment Clause had been violated, namely, 
 
 44. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 72 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 45. Id.  
 46. See id. at 73 (“By mandating a moment of silence, a State does not necessarily endorse 
any activity that might occur during the period.”). 
 47. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655–79 
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 48. See id. at 627–28 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
An Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only “coercive” practices or overt efforts 
at government proselytization, . . . but fails to take account of the numerous more subtle 
ways that government can show favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message of 
disapproval to others, would not, in my view, adequately protect the religious liberty or 
respect the religious diversity of the members of our pluralistic political community.  
Thus, this Court has never relied on coercion alone as the touchstone of Establishment 
Clause analysis. 
Id. 
 49. Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 50. Id. at 578 (majority opinion). 
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whether the “display of the crèche and the menorah, in their ‘respective 
particular physical settings,’ has the effect of endorsing or disapproving 
religious beliefs.”51  The Court then held that the display of the crèche was 
unconstitutional,52 but that the display involving the menorah, Christmas tree, 
and sign passed constitutional muster.53 
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy offered his 
understanding of the limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause: 
“government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or 
its exercise; and it may not . . . give direct benefits to religion in such a degree 
that it in fact ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do 
so.’”54  He went on to explain that these conditions were not unrelated, since it 
would be difficult to “establish a religion without some measure of more or 
less subtle coercion, be it in the form of taxation to supply the substantial 
benefits that would sustain a state-established faith, direct compulsion to 
observance, or governmental exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to 
proselytizing.”55  Thus, Justice Kennedy suggests, coercion broadly construed 
explains the limitations imposed on the states by the Establishment Clause. 
The plausibility of his account depends heavily upon how “coercion” is 
spelled out, and Justice Kennedy tried to flesh out its meaning.  After noting 
that the Court had “invalidated actions that further the interests of religion 
through the coercive power of government,”56 he offered examples such as 
“compelling or coercing participation or attendance at a religious activity,”57 
“requiring religious oaths to obtain government office or benefits,”58 and 
“delegating government power to religious groups.”59  Each of these examples 
referred to a case that had been decided by the Court, and so it seemed that 
Justice Kennedy’s interpretation at least reflected the then-current 
jurisprudence. 
Yet, when citing to these cases, Justice Kennedy did not delineate which 
were decided as Establishment Clause cases and which were decided as free 
 
 51. Id. at 597. 
 52. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602 (“The display of the crèche in this context, therefore, must be 
permanently enjoined.”). 
 53. See id. at 617–18 (“In these circumstances, then, the combination of the tree and the 
menorah communicates, not a simultaneous endorsement of both the Christian and Jewish faiths, 
but instead, a secular celebration of Christmas coupled with an acknowledgment of Chanukah as 
a contemporaneous alternative tradition.”). 
 54. Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). 
 55. Id. at 659–60. 
 56. Id. at 660. 
 57. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)). 
 58. Id. (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)). 
 59. Id. (citing Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982)). 
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exercise cases.  Consider, for example, Torcaso v. Watkins,60  where a state 
constitutional provision requiring “declaration of belief in God as a 
qualification for office”61 was at issue.  The Court made quite clear that 
religious coercion is impermissible—“neither a State nor the Federal 
Government can constitutionally force a person ‘to profess a belief or disbelief 
in any religion.’”62  But the Maryland oath requirement was unconstitutional 
because it was a violation of free exercise guarantees.63  While Justice 
Kennedy was correct to cite Torcaso for the proposition that religious coercion 
is constitutionally impermissible, Torcaso does not support a coercion analysis 
of the Establishment Clause. 
Justice Kennedy also cited Larkin v. Grendel’s Den,64 which involved a 
Massachusetts law vesting in church governing bodies the power to “veto 
applications for liquor licenses within a 500-foot radius of the church.”65  The 
Court struck down the law for several reasons, including that “the mere 
appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and State 
provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of some by 
reason of the power conferred,”66 which would make the statute have “a 
‘primary’ and ‘principal’ effect of advancing religion.”67  The Court also noted 
that “the core rationale underlying the Establishment Clause is preventing ‘a 
fusion of governmental and religious functions.’”68  Yet, there was no mention 
of coercion in the Larkin opinion.  The closest that the Court came to doing so 
was to note that the “churches’ power under the statute is standardless,”69 and 
to hypothesize that the granted power could “be used by churches to promote 
goals beyond insulating the church from undesirable neighbors; it could be 
employed for explicitly religious goals, for example, favoring liquor licenses 
for members of that congregation or adherents of that faith.”70  However, after 
noting how the power could be abused, the Court quickly pointed out that it 
would “assume that churches would act in good faith in their exercise of the 
statutory power.”71  Thus, although Larkin was an Establishment Clause case, 
coercion did not play any role in the rationale behind the Court’s decision to 
 
 60. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
 61. See id. at 489. 
 62. Id. at 495 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)). 
 63. Id. at 496 (“This Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the 
appellant’s freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him.”). 
 64. 459 U.S. 116 (1982). 
 65. Id. at 117. 
 66. Id. at 125–26. 
 67. Id. at 126 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)). 
 68. Id. (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)). 
 69. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 125. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618–19). 
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strike down the law at issue.  There was at most a hint of the potential for 
coercion, and the Court dismissed that possibility as not being credible. 
Engel was cited by Justice Kennedy for the proposition that the state could 
not compel attendance at a religious activity.72  However, he failed to note that 
no one had been compelled to do anything in Engel,73 and thus Engel “is a slim 
reed upon which to rest that absolute proposition.”74 
After discussing these cases, Justice Kennedy made a somewhat 
misleading claim: “The freedom to worship as one pleases without government 
interference or oppression is the great object of both the Establishment and the 
Free Exercise Clauses.”75  Although it might seem that by talking about both 
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause he is not forced to 
differentiate between the cases and discuss which were decided on which 
grounds, that is not correct.  He is suggesting that the object of each of the 
Clauses is to assure freedom of worship without government interference or 
oppression, but none of the cases suggests that.  Further, while the cases do 
suggest that the Free Exercise Clause is designed to secure that goal, they do 
not suggest that the purpose of the Establishment Clause can or should be 
similarly described. 
Certainly, Engel discusses the importance of preventing religious 
persecution by the state, and it suggests that there is a positive correlation 
between state endorsement of particular religious views on the one hand and 
religious persecution on the other.  However, the focus there is not on freedom 
of worship per se but, instead, on preventing the state from preferring some 
religious views over others.  Thus, protestations to the contrary 
notwithstanding, freedom of worship without government interference or 
oppression does not seem to be the purpose of each of the clauses.  Indeed, if 
the two different clauses had the same object, it is not at all clear why both of 
them would be needed.76  Regrettably, Justice Kennedy implies that in his view 
there is no need for both clauses when he suggests, “Barring all attempts to aid 
religion through government coercion goes far toward attainment of this object 
 
 72. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 660 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 
(1962)). 
 73. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting that children would neither have to 
participate in the exercise nor even be present for it).  But see supra note 13 and accompanying 
text (suggesting that putting the state’s power and prestige behind the prayer was at least 
indirectly coercive). 
 74. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 586 (1976). 
 75. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 76. See id. at 628 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“To 
require a showing of coercion, even indirect coercion, as an essential element of an Establishment 
Clause violation would make the Free Exercise Clause a redundancy.”). 
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[i.e., freedom of worship],”77 as if the protection of religion would not 
diminish even were there a constitutional amendment effecting a repeal of the 
Establishment Clause. 
Justice Kennedy understood that in different cases the Court had rejected 
his suggestion that “coercion is the sole touchstone of an Establishment Clause 
violation,”78 but he tried to limit the force of those cases by distinguishing 
among types of coercion.  There is no constitutional requirement that coercion 
be shown “if by ‘coercion’ is meant direct coercion in the classic sense of an 
establishment of religion that the Framers knew.”79  However,  
coercion need not be a direct tax in aid of religion or a test oath.  Symbolic 
recognition or accommodation of religious faith may violate the Clause in an 
extreme case. . . . [F]or example, . . . the Clause forbids a city to permit the 
permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall.80 
Thus, he suggested, some kinds of indirect aid to religion are so extreme that 
they would violate Establishment Clause guarantees. 
Yet, Justice Kennedy’s example of the Latin cross on top of city hall was 
not particularly helpful, precisely because it was so extreme.  He explained that 
the display would be coercive because “such an obtrusive year-round religious 
display would place the government’s weight behind an obvious effort to 
proselytize on behalf of a particular religion.”81  Yet, suppose instead that the 
Ten Commandments had been placed on the roof of city hall.  Would that be 
permissible because it was not an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of one 
 
 77. Id. at 660 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 660–61. 
 80. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 81. Id. 
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particular religion?82  Would it matter were the cross not placed on city hall but 
instead placed elsewhere on state property?83 
Justice Kennedy announced that “[s]peech may coerce in some 
circumstances,”84 although he was not particularly helpful in distinguishing 
between coercive and noncoercive speech.  While he noted that “where the 
government’s act of recognition or accommodation is passive and 
symbolic, . . . any intangible benefit to religion is unlikely to present a realistic 
risk of establishment,”85 he did not seem to appreciate that such a point 
undercuts the coerciveness of the year-round display that he thought 
paradigmatically represented an Establishment Clause violation. 
The position outlined by Justice Kennedy was even more difficult to 
understand when he suggested that “[a]bsent coercion, the risk of infringement 
of religious liberty by passive or symbolic accommodation is minimal,”86 
because he had just characterized a passive display as itself coercive.  While he 
obviously does not think that all passive or symbolic displays are coercive, he 
never explained why the hypothesized, passive display on top of city hall 
would be coercive whereas other state displays favoring particular religious 
views would not be. 
Justice Kennedy disagreed with the Allegheny Court that the state-
sponsored display of the crèche violated the Establishment Clause.  After all, 
 
 82. Cf. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
The three most popular religions in the United States—Christianity, Judaism, and Islam—
which combined account for 97.7% of all believers—are monotheistic.  See U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004–2005, p. 55 
(124th ed. 2004) (Table No. 67). All of them, moreover (Islam included), believe that the 
Ten Commandments were given by God to Moses, and are divine prescriptions for a 
virtuous life. 
Id.; see also Mark Strasser, Thou Shalt Not?, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 439, 
476 (2006) (“Would it matter, for example, if a large Latin cross and a Star of David were 
permanently erected on the roof of city hall, since it would then not be the case that the state was 
trying to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion?”).  Justice Kennedy did not join this part of 
Justice Scalia’s dissent.  See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 885 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Justice Scalia, 
with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas join, and with whom Justice Kennedy joins as to 
Parts II and III, dissenting.”).   
 83. See Jason Marques, Note, To Bear a Cross: The Establishment Clause, Historic 
Preservation, and Eminent Domain Intersect at the Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial, 59 FLA. L. 
REV. 829, 855 (2007) (“The federal circuits . . . have frequently considered governmental 
sponsorship of Latin crosses on public land.  In the great majority of federal decisions, displays of 
crosses on public land have been declared unconstitutional.”).  But see Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 666 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The fact that the crèche and menorah are 
both located on government property, even at the very seat of government, is likewise 
inconsequential.”). 
 84. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 85. Id. at 662. 
 86. Id. 
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he noted, “Passersby who disagree with the message conveyed by these 
displays are free to ignore them, or even to turn their backs, just as they are 
free to do when they disagree with any other form of government speech.”87  
But the same might have been said to the passersby who disagreed with the 
message conveyed by a cross permanently erected above city hall. 
One might distinguish between the hypothesized permanent city hall 
display and the seasonal display at issue in Allegheny by noting that in one 
case but not in the other there is no religious display during some portion of the 
year.  However, such a distinction would require an analysis of how much of 
the year the state might display religious objects without crossing the relevant 
constitutional line.  Justice Kennedy suggested that a city might violate 
Establishment Clause guarantees if it “chose to recognize, through religious 
displays, every significant Christian holiday while ignoring the holidays of all 
other faiths.”88  Yet, this too would require an analysis of whether exhibiting 
displays at most but not all significant holidays of one religion would violate 
constitutional requirements.89  By the same token, an analysis might be 
required regarding how many non-Christian displays would be required to 
avoid the charge that the state was seeking to endorse one particular religion.90 
Justice Kennedy does not spell out the coercion test sufficiently clearly to 
know what it permits and what it does not, although Justice O’Connor warned 
in her Allegheny concurrence that an 
Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only “coercive” practices or overt 
efforts at government proselytization . . . but fails to take account of the 
numerous more subtle ways that government can show favoritism to particular 
beliefs or convey a message of disapproval to others, would not, in my view, 
adequately protect the religious liberty or respect the religious diversity of the 
members of our pluralistic political community.91 
 
 87. Id. at 664. 
 88. Id. at 664 n.3. 
 89. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 607 (“But, for Justice Kennedy, would it be enough of a 
preference for Christianity if that city each year displayed a crèche for 40 days during the 
Christmas season and a cross for 40 days during Lent (and never the symbols of other 
religions)?”). 
 90. Cf. id. 
If one wished to be “uncharitable” to Justice Kennedy, . . . one could say that his 
methodology requires counting the number of days during which the government displays 
Christian symbols and subtracting from this the number of days during which non-
Christian symbols are displayed, divided by the number of different non-Christian 
religions represented in these displays, and then somehow factoring into this equation the 
prominence of the display’s location and the degree to which each symbol possesses an 
inherently proselytizing quality. 
Id. 
 91. Id. at 627–28 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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Justice O’Connor’s warning is well-taken insofar as coercion is defined 
relatively narrowly.  However, if “coercion” is broadly construed, then it is not 
at all clear that the coercion test is less protective than other tests.92  
Regrettably, one of the points of disagreement among members of the Court 
involves how broadly the term should be construed, as was demonstrated in the 
very decision in which the Court adopted the coercion test as a standard to 
determine whether Establishment Clause guarantees have been violated. 
II.  THE COERCION TEST IS ADOPTED AS A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD 
While the Court in various decisions had at least suggested that 
Establishment Clause guarantees could be violated even absent state coercion, 
the Court in Lee v. Weisman nonetheless adopted the coercion test as a 
constitutional standard for evaluating challenges under the Establishment 
Clause.93  Lee has not been particularly helpful for lower courts because there 
were so many respects in which the practice at issue was described as coercive.  
Because the Court failed to specify whether the Establishment Clause only 
precluded a state’s engaging in all of these coercive practices or, instead, a 
state’s engaging in any or, perhaps, some of them, lower courts have had great 
difficulty in offering a coherent account of Lee, even in the context of 
challenges to school prayer. 
A. Lee and the Coercion Test 
Lee was unusual in several respects.  Members of the Court could not 
agree about a variety of basic issues including what constitutes religious 
coercion by the state and whether a showing of such coercion was a necessary 
or sufficient condition for a finding that Establishment Clause guarantees had 
been violated.  Nonetheless, several courts have referred to the Lee coercion 
test,94 and it seems generally accepted that such a test was adopted and applied 
in Lee.95 
 
 92. A separate question is whether spelling out both Establishment and Free Exercise Clause 
guarantees in terms of coercion would obviate the need to have both Clauses.  See supra notes 
75–76 and accompanying text. 
 93. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 578 (1992). 
 94. See Wynne v. Great Falls, S.C., 376 F.3d 292, 302 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing the 
Lee coercion test); Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 63 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing 
the “coercion test set out in Lee v. Weisman”); Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462, 
469 (5th Cir. 2001) (referring to the “coercion test of Lee v. Weisman”). 
 95. See Kristi L. Bowman, An Empirical Study of Evolution, Creationism, and Intelligent 
Design Instruction in Public Schools, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 301, 314 (2007) (explaining that “the 
‘coercion test’ appeared to constitute the basis for the Court’s 1992 decision in Lee v. Weisman”); 
Nicholas A. Schuneman, One Nation, Under . . . the Watchmaker?: Intelligent Design and the 
Establishment Clause, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 179, 219 (2007) (discussing “the coercion test of Lee v. 
Weisman”); Christopher D. Tomlinson, Changing the Rules of Establishment Clause Litigation: 
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Lee involved a challenge to a school policy in which local members of the 
clergy were invited to give invocations and benedictions at public school 
graduations.96  The Court noted that “the controlling precedents as they relate 
to prayer and religious exercise in primary and secondary public schools 
compel the holding here that the policy of the city of Providence is an 
unconstitutional one.”97  It then tried to explain why that was so.  The Court 
first explained the numerous ways in which the state had been implicated.  For 
example, a “school official, the principal, decided that an invocation and a 
benediction should be given,”98 which “from a constitutional perspective 
[was] . . . as if a state statute decreed that the prayers must occur.”99 Further, 
that same state actor had chosen “the religious participant, here a rabbi, and 
that choice [was] also attributable to the State.”100  Finally, the principal had 
provided the rabbi with a “copy of the ‘Guidelines for Civic Occasions,’ and 
advised him that his prayers should be nonsectarian.”101  By doing so, “the 
principal directed and controlled the content of the prayers.”102 
Not only did the Court construe the case as involving state-sponsorship of 
prayer that the state itself had a hand in directing and controlling,103 but the 
 
An Alternative to the Public Expression of Religion Act, 61 VAND. L. REV. 261, 271 (2008) (“The 
Court adopted the Coercion Test in Lee v. Weisman.”); William Trunk, The Scourge of 
Contextualism: Ceremonial Deism and the Establishment Clause, 49 B.C. L. REV. 571, 
578 (2008) (“[I]n 1992, in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy invoked what has come to be known 
as the ‘coercion test’ to strike down a nonsectarian prayer at a public school graduation.”); Maya 
Anderson, Note, The Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prison Programs: A Real World Analysis 
Based in New Mexico, 37 N.M. L. REV. 487, 501 (2007) (discussing “the introduction of the 
coercion test in Lee v. Weisman”); Richard R.W. Fields, Comment, Perks for Prisoners Who 
Pray: Using the Coercion Test to Decide Establishment Clause Challenges to Faith-Based Prison 
Units, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 541, 558 (“The modern coercion test is rooted in Justice Kennedy’s 
dissent in Allegheny County.  However, it was not applied in a majority opinion until Lee v. 
Weisman.”); Marques, supra note 83, at 848 n.123 (“In Lee v. Weisman . . . the Court applied 
Justice Kennedy’s coercion test in the context of school prayer.”); Tyson Radley O’Connell, 
Note, How Did the Ten Commandments End on Both Sides of the Wall of Separation Between 
Church and State?  The Contradicting Opinions of Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary v. ACLU, 
69 MONT. L. REV. 263, 265 (2008) (“The Court applied the coercion test in Lee v. Weisman.”); 
Brian Wheeler, Note, The Pledge of Allegiance in the Classroom and the Court: An Epic Struggle 
over the Meaning of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 2008 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 
281, 290 (“The third test used by the Court in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence is the 
coercion test from Lee v. Weisman.”). 
 96. Lee, 505 U.S. at 577. 
 97. Id. at 586–87. 
 98. Id. at 587. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Lee, 505 U.S. at 588. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 586 (“State officials direct the performance of a formal religious exercise at 
promotional and graduation ceremonies for secondary schools.”).  But see id. at 640 (Scalia, J., 
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Court also discussed further elements making the school policy constitutionally 
suspect.  For example, after noting that attendance at the graduation was 
voluntary,104 the Court nonetheless suggested that students’ “attendance and 
participation in the state-sponsored religious activity are in a fair and real sense 
obligatory.”105  Because attendance at the activity was obligatory in the 
relevant sense, the students were being coerced into attending a state-run 
exercise during which prayers would be offered.106 
The Court did not impute bad motivation to the state, accepting that “the 
directions for the content of the prayers were a good-faith attempt by the 
school to ensure that the sectarianism which is so often the flashpoint for 
religious animosity be removed from the graduation ceremony.”107  However, 
the Court noted that this did not settle the issue: 
The question is not the good faith of the school in attempting to make the 
prayer acceptable to most persons, but the legitimacy of its undertaking that 
enterprise at all when the object is to produce a prayer to be used in a formal 
religious exercise which students, for all practical purposes, are obliged to 
attend.108 
By characterizing this as an attempt to make the address non-offensive to most 
students, the Court implied that the state was imposing prayers on some, 
however few, for whom this would be most unwelcome.  By requiring 
attendance at an event at which there would be unwelcome prayers, the state 
was proselytizing and, perhaps, engaging in some form of religious coercion. 
Noting that the “First Amendment’s Religion Clauses mean that religious 
beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be either proscribed or 
prescribed by the State,”109 the Court explained that school officials are not 
permitted to “assist in composing prayers as an incident to a formal exercise 
for their students.”110  This prohibition is especially stringent when younger 
children are involved, because “there are heightened concerns with protecting 
freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and 
secondary public schools.”111  These concerns are greater still when prayers are 
 
dissenting) (“The Court identifies nothing in the record remotely suggesting that school officials 
have ever drafted, edited, screened, or censored graduation prayers, or that Rabbi Gutterman was 
a mouthpiece of the school officials.”). 
 104. Id. at 586 (“[T]he school district does not require attendance as a condition for receipt of 
the diploma.”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. 
 107. Id. at 588. 
 108. Id. at 588–89. 
 109. Id. at 589. 
 110. Id. at 590 (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)). 
 111. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592. 
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involved, because such “exercises in public schools carry a particular risk of 
indirect coercion.”112 
There are at least two different ways to understand the constitutional 
concerns implicated here, depending upon whether one emphasizes the state’s 
role in the composition of the prayers or, instead, in assuring that (possibly 
young) children will be present at an exercise where the prayers will be 
offered.  If the focus is only on the former, then it should not matter whether 
prayers are offered at a state-sponsored exercise as long as the state does not 
have a role in composing or providing guidelines for the prayers.113 
But if there are heightened concerns involving the freedom of conscience 
of young children, especially when prayers are being offered at a public school 
exercise, then state practices should not be immunized from review merely 
because the state does not shape the prayers that will be offered at compulsory 
public functions.  The coercive pressure on children in primary and secondary 
schools is present regardless of who authored the prayers.  If the goal is to 
prevent the imposition of such coercion rather than merely to prevent students 
from being involuntarily exposed to state-authored prayers, then prayer at 
public school functions must be scrutinized whether or not the state has a hand 
in fashioning what the children will hear. 
The Lee Court was not implying that the state intended to coerce 
individuals into adopting particular religious beliefs.114  Nor was the Court 
implying that most individuals would perceive the exercise as coercive.115  
However, the Court suggested, those were not the relevant issues to consider; 
instead, the prayer exercises should be examined from the perspective of the 
dissenter.  From that person’s point of view, standing during an invocation or 
benediction might not simply be characterized as standing in respectful silence; 
it might instead be thought to signify much more: “What to most believers may 
seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their 
religious practices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or 
dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a 
religious orthodoxy.”116  The dissenter would feel coerced, both in that she 
might feel that she could not leave and in that she might feel forced to stand 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. But see supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text (discussing the broader interpretation 
suggested by Engel). 
 114. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 115. Cf. Lee, 505 U.S. at 589. 
We are asked to recognize the existence of a practice of nonsectarian prayer, prayer within 
the embrace of what is known as the Judeo-Christian tradition, prayer which is more 
acceptable than one which, for example, makes explicit references to the God of Israel, or 
to Jesus Christ, or to a patron saint. 
Id. 
 116. Id. at 592. 
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during the prayer.  Further, she might not feel as if she were merely getting out 
of her seat as a sign of respect but, instead, as if she were thereby being forced 
to signify her support of or participation in the religious exercise. 
The Court explained that “the school district’s supervision and control of a 
high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer 
pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain 
respectful silence during the invocation and benediction.”117  Here, the Court’s 
focus is on the state’s control of the graduation ceremony as a whole rather 
than on its influence with respect to the contents of the invocation and 
benediction.  Further, the Court did not minimize the degree to which the 
ceremony would be experienced as coercive, since this “pressure, though 
subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”118 
By offering this analysis, the Court seemed to be making two distinct 
points: (1) The type of pressure qualified for constitutional purposes; and (2)  
the amount of pressure sufficed for constitutional purposes.  First, Justice 
Kennedy suggested in his Allegheny dissent that coercion could be “more or 
less subtle,”119 and the way that he read the previous case law to be compatible 
with his interpretation of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence required, for 
example, that both Engel and Schempp had involved coercion,120 even though 
in both of those cases the students had not been required to be present for the 
religious presentations.  While the Engel and Schempp context might be 
differentiated from that of Lee in that the former involved an instructional and 
the latter a ceremonial setting,121 they all involved a kind of psychological 
coercion to be present at a state-sponsored school activity. 
Second, while the Court has never offered a detailed analysis of how much 
pressure must be exerted in order for Establishment Clause guarantees to be 
violated, it would be unsurprising for a member of the Court to suggest that the 
coercion, if any, in a particular case was de minimis and hence not enough to 
violate constitutional guarantees.122  For example, Justice Scalia noted in his 
 
 117. Id. at 593. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659. 
 120. Contra Greene, supra note 43, at 458 (“[A]fter Engel and Schempp, teacher-led prayer in 
public schools was unconstitutional, not because of coercion (psychological or otherwise), but 
because of the structural claim that government may not prescribe and lead prayer.”). 
 121. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 643 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Engel and Schempp do not constitute 
an exception to the rule, distilled from historical practice, that public ceremonies may include 
prayer . . . ; rather, they simply do not fall within the scope of the rule (for the obvious reason that 
school instruction is not a public ceremony).”). 
 122. Cf. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835 (2000) (“We are unwilling to elevate scattered 
de minimis statutory violations, discovered and remedied by the relevant authorities themselves 
prior to any litigation, to such a level as to convert an otherwise unobjectionable parishwide 
program into a law that has the effect of advancing religion.”); id. at 849 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“Although respondents claim that Chapter 2 aid has been diverted to 
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Lee dissent that there was “nothing in the record to indicate that failure of 
attending students to take part in the invocation or benediction was subject to 
any penalty or discipline.”123  Such a point might have been directed both to 
the type and to the amount of pressure that had been imposed.124  He clearly 
believed that the amount was de minimis, having described the ceremony as a 
“minimal inconvenience”125 for dissenters.126 
The Lee Court recognized that many of the students did not feel at all 
pressured to participate in this ceremony; on the contrary, they welcomed the 
prayer and might have felt that the ceremony would be incomplete without 
some kind of acknowledgment of the divine.127  The Court further recognized 
that many of those preferring not to have an invocation and benediction 
included in the ceremony nonetheless did not feel compromised by standing 
while others took part in the prayer.128  However, the Court did not focus on 
those who had no objections to the practice but, instead, on the individual who 
had strong reservations about participating in such an exercise: “But for the 
dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable perception that she is being 
forced by the State to pray in a manner her conscience will not allow, the 
injury is no less real.”129 
Yet, the state was not forcing anyone to pray.  For example, no one was 
monitoring the students to make sure that they said, “Amen,” or engaged in 
other symbolic behavior that might be construed as participating in prayer.130  
Rather, the dissenter was merely being pressured to stand.  The Court 
understood this point, but noted that “for many, if not most, of the students at 
 
religious instruction, that evidence is de minimis.”).  But see Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. 38, 36–37 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“There are no 
de minimis violations of the Constitution—no constitutional harms so slight that the courts are 
obliged to ignore them.”). 
 123. Lee, 505 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 124. Cf. id. at 642–43 (“To characterize the ‘subtle coercive pressures,’ . . . allegedly present 
here as the ‘practical’ equivalent of the legal sanctions in Barnette is . . . well, let me just say it is 
not a ‘delicate and fact-sensitive’ analysis.” (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943))). 
 125. Id. at 646. 
 126. Cf. Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 1997) (“If these prayers 
‘endorsed’ religion, the endorsement was indirect, remote, and incidental—and a de minimis 
religious gesture does not, by itself, create an Establishment Clause problem.”). 
 127. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 595–96 (“What for many of Deborah’s classmates and their parents 
was a spiritual imperative was for Daniel and Deborah Weisman religious conformance 
compelled by the State.”). 
 128. Id. at 593 (majority opinion). 
 129. Id. (emphasis added). 
 130. See id. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he very linchpin of the Court’s opinion— is 
almost as intriguing for what it does not say as for what it says.  It does not say, for example, that 
students are psychologically coerced to bow their heads, place their hands in a Dürer-like prayer 
position, pay attention to the prayers, utter ‘Amen,’ or in fact pray.”). 
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the graduation, the act of standing or remaining silent was an expression of 
participation in the rabbi’s prayer.”131  Because that was so, the dissenter’s act 
of standing would be indistinguishable from the standing and participation 
performed by most of the other students. 
While correct that an external observer might not be able to distinguish 
between what the dissenter and the non-dissenter were doing during the 
invocation and benediction, the Court overstates the point when suggesting that 
the dissenter was being forced to pray.132  She would know that she was 
standing and not praying.  Further, even were a speaker to intone, “Let us bow 
our heads and pray,” and even were the dissenter to bow her head, she would 
still know that she was not praying, although she might be pretending to do 
so.133  It would not be reasonable for a dissenter to have suggested that she had 
been forced to pray, at least if prayer is a kind of internal activity. 
Nonetheless, pressuring individuals to appear to be praying violates 
constitutional guarantees.  That is not because the individual would think that 
she was praying when in fact she was only standing there with head bowed.  
Instead, it would be for other reasons,134 including that individuals cannot be 
forced by the state to articulate particular positions.  As the Court explained in 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,135 “If there is any fixed 
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.”136 
The Lee Court explained that it would be of “little comfort to a 
dissenter . . . to be told that for her the act of standing or remaining in silence 
signifies mere respect, rather than participation.”137  Basically, the Court 
believed it unimportant for these purposes to distinguish between (1) actually 
praying, and (2) being viewed as praying: “What matters is that, given our 
social conventions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the 
 
 131. Id. at 593 (majority opinion). 
 132. But see Larry R. Thaxton, Comment, Silence Begets Religion: Bown v. Gwinnett County 
Sch. Dist. and the Unconstitutionality of Moments of Silence in Public Schools, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1399, 1438 (1996) (“The mere act of remaining silent for a minute while giving others the 
opportunity to pray, in essence, forces the dissenter to participate in religion.”). 
 133. Cf. Lee Ann Rabe, A Rose by Any Other Name: School Prayer Redefined as a Moment of 
Silence Is Still Unconstitutional, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 57, 77 (2004) (“Peer pressure from these 
students will make those who choose not to pray uncomfortable and may force them into doing 
something they would rather not--pray or, at least, pretend to pray.”). 
 134. For a discussion of why this should not only be understood as a forced speech case, see 
infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 135. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 136. Id. at 642. 
 137. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992). 
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group exercise signified her own participation or approval of it.”138  While the 
Court understood that some who did not wish to participate might nonetheless 
not have been averse to being viewed as participating,139 others might have 
found it quite offensive. 
Suppose, however, that standing did not signify participation, perhaps 
because those who participated would not only stand but would also bow their 
heads.140  Or, perhaps included in the program was a disclaimer specifically 
noting that those who stood during the invocation and benediction should not 
be assumed to be participating.141  The question would be whether the policy 
would still violate constitutional guarantees.  By implying that public 
graduation invocations or benedictions should be analyzed as forced speech 
cases, the Court suggests that there are ways to remove the constitutional taint 
without omitting the invocation or benediction.  Yet, someone who felt 
psychologically coerced because of the inclusion of an invocation or 
benediction in a public school graduation ceremony would likely still feel 
coerced by such practices, even were there a note in the program suggesting 
that an individual’s standing quietly during the invocation or  benediction did 
not signify agreement or participation.  If the constitutional evil is state 
facilitation of religious coercion, then the difficulty is not removed by a simple 
notation in the program. 
Although the Court mentioned that Deborah Weisman attended her 
graduation,142 the Court does not mention what she did during the graduation.  
Suppose, for example, that she had remained seated during the invocation and 
benediction.  No one could have mistaken her actions as involving 
participation or approval of the invocation and benediction.143  Would there 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. (“And no doubt some persons who have no desire to join a prayer have little 
objection to standing as a sign of respect for those who do.”). 
 140. Id. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
It is fanciful enough to say that “a reasonable dissenter,” standing head erect in a class of 
bowed heads, “could believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or 
approval of it.”  It is beyond the absurd to say that she could entertain such a belief while 
pointedly declining to rise. 
Id. 
 141. See id. at 644–45 
Given the odd basis for the Court’s decision, . . . [a]ll that is seemingly needed is an 
announcement, or perhaps a written insertion at the beginning of the graduation program, 
to the effect that, while all are asked to rise for the invocation and benediction, none is 
compelled to join in them, nor will be assumed, by rising, to have done so. 
Id. 
 142. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 584 (majority opinion) (“Deborah and her family attended the 
graduation, where the prayers were recited.”). 
 143. See id. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s notion that a student who simply sits 
in ‘respectful silence’ during the invocation and benediction (when all others are standing) has 
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then have been no harm to her?  Would the only harm have been to those who 
had unwillingly stood and “participated?” 
The Court noted that Deborah was enrolled in high school and would 
likely have to confront the same choice during her high school graduation that 
she had been forced to make during her middle school graduation.144  But the 
Court’s analysis suggests that it is not the fact that there will be an invocation 
and benediction that is relevant; rather, the constitutional injury lies in her 
being pressured to stand and unwillingly signify her approval of the prayers.  
But if that is the injury, then what she did during her middle school graduation 
would at least seem relevant to the constitutional inquiry. 
Certainly, some on the Court believed that the emphasis should not have 
been on whether the student’s standing constituted participation.  For example, 
while arguing that the student’s being pressured to participate in a state-
sponsored religious activity was a sufficient condition for its constitutional 
invalidity,145 Justice Blackmun also suggested in his concurring opinion that 
the state’s taking a religious position was constitutionally objectionable 
whether or not dissenters were forced to participate.146  Given that Justices 
O’Connor and Stevens joined Justice’s Blackmun’s concurring opinion,147 and 
given Justice Blackmun’s express denial that coercion had to be shown if a 
state practice was to be struck down on Establishment Clause grounds,148 it 
might seem surprising that Lee stands for the proposition that some form of the 
coercion test best captures the Establishment Clause guarantees.149  Indeed, the 
other Justice signing onto Justice Kennedy’s opinion, Justice Souter, also made 
 
somehow joined—or would somehow be perceived as having joined—in the prayers is nothing 
short of ludicrous.”). 
 144. Id. at 584 (majority opinion) (“Deborah Weisman is enrolled as a student at Classical 
High School in Providence and from the record it appears likely, if not certain, that an invocation 
and benediction will be conducted at her high school graduation.”). 
 145. Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Although our precedents make clear that proof of 
government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation, it is sufficient.  
Government pressure to participate in a religious activity is an obvious indication that the 
government is endorsing or promoting religion.”). 
 146. Id. at 606 (“The mixing of government and religion can be a threat to free government, 
even if no one is forced to participate.  When the government puts its imprimatur on a particular 
religion, it conveys a message of exclusion to all those who do not adhere to the favored 
beliefs.”). 
 147. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 599 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 148. Id. at 604 (“The Court repeatedly has recognized that a violation of the Establishment 
Clause is not predicated on coercion.”). 
 149. Compare Mary Jean Dolan, Government-Sponsored Chaplains and Crisis: Walking the 
Fine Line in Disaster Response and Daily Life, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 505, 538 (2008) (“The 
coercion test represents the rock-bottom value underlying the Establishment Clause.”), with 
Anthony Barone Kolenc, “Mr. Scalia’s Neighborhood”: A Home for Minority Religions?, 81 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 819, 833 (2007) (“Conventional wisdom assumes that the most likely Lemon 
replacement under the new majority will be the ‘coercion’ test . . . .”). 
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clear in his concurring opinion (joined by Justices Stevens and O’Connor)150 
that coercion was not a necessary element of an Establishment Clause 
violation.151 
Nonetheless, these Justices did write or sign onto concurring opinions 
rather than, for example, opinions that were concurring in part or only 
concurring in the judgment.152  Further, a different way of counting the Lee 
opinions seems to yield a majority view about coercion.  Justice Scalia in his 
dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and White,153 
argued that a more restricted notion of coercion should be the constitutional 
standard.154  Thus, Justice Kennedy plus the dissenting Justices seem together 
to suggest that proof of coercion is a necessary element of an Establishment 
Clause claim. 
The Lee majority suggested that the graduation prayers placed dissenters in 
an unenviable position: “participating, with all that implies, or protesting.”155  
While refusing to comment whether imposing such a forced choice on adults 
violated the Constitution,156 the Court suggested that the Constitution did 
preclude the imposition of such a choice on students in primary and secondary 
schools.157  Individuals of that age are more subject to peer pressure than are 
older individuals, and thus the Court presumably felt that such pressure 
constituted sufficient coercion as to be constitutionally cognizable.158 
 
 150. Lee, 505 U.S. at 609 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 151. Id. at 619 (“Our precedents may not always have drawn perfectly straight lines.  They 
simply cannot, however, support the position that a showing of coercion is necessary to a 
successful Establishment Clause claim.”); see also Greene, supra note 43, at 460. 
I say that Justice Kennedy is alone among the five-Justice majority in deeming coercion a 
necessary predicate for an Establishment Clause claim (absent an established state 
religion), because the Justices joining Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion—Justices 
Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter—wrote and joined separate opinions to stress 
that for them, coercion was not necessary to an Establishment Clause claim. 
Green, supra note 43, at 460. 
 152. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 599 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (Justices Stevens and O’Connor 
joining); id. at 609 (Souter, J., concurring) (Justices Stevens and O’Connor joining). 
 153. See id. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 154. See id. at 640 (“The coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion 
was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of 
penalty.”); see also id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the standard be “an 
establishment coerced by force of law”). 
 155. Id. at 593 (majority opinion). 
 156. Id. (“We do not address whether that choice is acceptable if the affected citizens are 
mature adults.”). 
 157. Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (“We think the State may not, consistent with the Establishment 
Clause, place primary and secondary school children in this position.”). 
 158. Id. (“Research in psychology supports the common assumption that adolescents are often 
susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in 
matters of social convention.”). 
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Lee would have been much easier to understand and apply if the Court had 
made clear whether the constitutional difficulty was that dissenters were being 
compelled to participate in a religious exercise159 or, instead, that they were 
being subjected to prayer at a public ceremony.160  To the extent that it was the 
latter, it would have been helpful had the Court made clear whether the state’s 
having had a hand in the composition of the prayer was the constitutional 
difficulty, rather than, for example, the state’s having had a hand in assuring 
attendance at a public function at which prayers would be offered. 
The Lee Court understood that dissenting students could simply not attend 
the ceremony and avoid being subjected to the unwanted choice of appearing 
to participate on the one hand or objecting on the other.161  However, the Court 
refused to characterize skipping the graduation as a viable option,162 at least in 
part, because of the importance of the occasion.163 
The occasion’s importance and the relative ease with which the respective 
prayers might be avoided distinguished Lee from a previous case, Marsh v. 
 
 159. See id. at 594 (“The injury caused by the government’s action, and the reason why 
Daniel and Deborah Weisman object to it, is that the State, in a school setting, in effect required 
participation in a religious exercise.”). 
 160. See id. 
But the embarrassment and the intrusion of the religious exercise cannot be refuted by 
arguing that these prayers, and similar ones to be said in the future, are of a de minimis 
character.  To do so would be an affront to the rabbi who offered them and to all those for 
whom the prayers were an essential and profound recognition of divine authority.  And 
for the same reason, we think that the intrusion is greater than the two minutes or so of 
time consumed for prayers like these.  Assuming, as we must, that the prayers were 
offensive to the student and the parent who now object, the intrusion was both real and, in 
the context of a secondary school, a violation of the objectors’ rights. 
Id. 
 161. See id. at 594–95. 
 162. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 595. 
And to say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high school graduation is 
formalistic in the extreme.  True, Deborah could elect not to attend commencement 
without renouncing her diploma; but we shall not allow the case to turn on this point.  
Everyone knows that in our society and in our culture high school graduation is one of 
life’s most significant occasions.  A school rule which excuses attendance is beside the 
point.  Attendance may not be required by official decree, yet it is apparent that a student 
is not free to absent herself from the graduation exercise in any real sense of the term 
“voluntary,” for absence would require forfeiture of those intangible benefits which have 
motivated the student through youth and all her high school years.  Graduation is a time 
for family and those closest to the student to celebrate success and express mutual wishes 
of gratitude and respect, all to the end of impressing upon the young person the role that it 
is his or her right and duty to assume in the community and all of its diverse parts. 
Id. 
 163. See id. (“The importance of the event is the point the school district and the United 
States rely upon to argue that a formal prayer ought to be permitted, but it becomes one of the 
principal reasons why their argument must fail.”). 
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Chambers,164 where the Court had upheld the Nebraska Legislature’s practice 
of beginning sessions with a prayer.165  The “atmosphere at the opening of a 
session of a state legislature where adults are free to enter and leave with little 
comment and for any number of reasons cannot compare with the constraining 
potential of the one school event most important for the student to attend.”166  
Thus, the Court implied, nothing would be signified by one’s leaving the 
chamber before the legislative prayer was offered, whereas one’s leaving 
before the graduation invocation or benediction would signify dissent.167 
The Court also distinguished the two cases by emphasizing the ages of 
those who might be forced to make a difficult choice, noting: 
We do not address whether that choice [i.e., being forced to choose between 
protesting or unwillingly participating in a religious exercise] is acceptable if 
the affected citizens are mature adults, but we think the State may not, 
consistent with the Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school 
children in this position.168 
There are various ways to read Lee.  Perhaps it is suggesting that the 
coercion test determines whether the Establishment Clause has been violated, 
although the standard advocated by Justice Kennedy is much broader than the 
standard articulated by Justice Scalia.169  On the other hand, most members of 
the Lee majority argued that the Establishment Clause could be violated even 
absent proof of coercion.170  Thus, Lee might be read as offering either a 
necessary or a sufficient condition for a finding that the Establishment Clause 
has been violated. 
 
 164. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 165. See id. at 793–94. 
 166. Lee, 505 U.S. at 597 (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792). 
 167. A student might come late to the graduation and leave early, thereby missing the 
invocation and benediction, but even forcing the student to do this would be to exact too high a 
price.  See id. at 596 (“To say that a student must remain apart from the ceremony at the opening 
invocation and closing benediction is to risk compelling conformity in an environment analogous 
to the classroom setting, where we have said the risk of compulsion is especially high.”). 
 168. Id. at 593.  The Court did not seem to appreciate that grade school children sometimes 
go on field trips to see legislatures in session.  See, e.g., H.R. 1707, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 
2007), available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/80R/billtext/pdf/HR01707I.pdf (passing 
a house resolution welcoming third graders visiting state capitol in Texas); S.Res. 771, 80th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007) available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/80R/billtext/pdf/ 
R00771F.pdf (passing a senate resolution welcoming first graders who were visiting state capitol 
in Texas). 
 169. See Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 
499, 504 (2002) (“The choice of the word ‘coercion’ as a title is probably unfortunate because 
Justice Kennedy defined the term much more broadly than is usually done, allowing that the 
coercion required for an Establishment Clause violation may take a variety of ‘more or less 
subtle’ forms.”). 
 170. See supra text accompanying note 148. 
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An additional confusing aspect of Lee is that the Court discussed numerous 
respects in which the state was implicated in the creation and presentation of 
the benediction and invocation.  It also discussed the various ways in which 
dissenting students were being coerced into participating in or witnessing a 
religious activity at a state-sponsored event.  However, the Court did not offer 
any guidance with respect to which of the state practices at issue sufficed for a 
finding of unconstitutionality.  But this meant that some courts might view Lee 
as precluding a wide range of practices, whereas other courts would view Lee 
as precluding only those practices that mirrored the Providence policies and 
procedures.  As was eminently foreseeable, very different interpretations of 
Lee would be offered in the circuits, resulting in relevantly similar cases being 
decided differently. 
Lee left a number of issues unresolved.  For example, one issue is whether 
the same rules respecting religious coercion apply if the students attending the 
public function are older, e.g., are in college.  Lee also failed to determine 
whether the individuals who are the focus of concern at a graduation are the 
students or, instead, all who might reasonably be expected to attend.  A 
different issue that was raised but not decided involved what the state could do, 
if anything, to immunize itself from the charge that it was responsible for the 
offering of a prayer at a public function.  Would the state immunize school 
prayer from constitutional challenge if the state played no role in the 
composition of the benediction?  Or would the state’s coercing attendance at a 
school event at which it was known that a prayer would be offered suffice for a 
showing that Establishment Clause guarantees had been violated? 
B. Coercion and Age 
One issued raised but not decided in Lee was whether religiously coercive 
school settings violated the Establishment Clause only when schoolchildren 
were involved.171  The Lee Court had explicitly distinguished Marsh by noting 
that the legislative prayer at issue there would be heard by adults rather than 
children,172 and thus Lee might be thought inapplicable if older dissenting 
students were attending a public function at which prayers were offered.173 
 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 164–68. 
 172. See supra text accompanying note 166. 
 173. See, e.g., Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 2003) (“In construing the 
Establishment Clause, the Court has made clear that a state is prohibited from sponsoring prayer 
in its elementary and secondary schools.  That said, the Court has never directly addressed 
whether the Establishment Clause forbids state-sponsored prayer at a public college or 
university.”). 
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1. Tanford 
At issue in Tanford v. Brand174 was an Establishment Clause challenge to 
an Indiana University practice of including a nonsectarian invocation and 
benediction at the school’s commencement ceremony.175  There were several 
plaintiffs, including one professor and several students, each of whom thought 
that having a prayer at a state university commencement was inappropriate, 
offensive, or at least discomfort-producing.176  Although one of the plaintiffs 
testified that he viewed such a prayer as an attempt to proselytize,177 no one 
claimed that his or her religious beliefs would be changed as a result of hearing 
these prayers.178 
Kimberly MacDonald, one of the students challenging the ceremony, had 
attended the commencement ceremony when she had received her 
undergraduate degree, although she had been “uncomfortable in participating 
in a service led by someone of a different faith.”179  She was unsure whether 
she would attend the ceremony when receiving her graduate degree,180 at least 
in part, because she “would be bothered if her daughter saw a religious figure 
on the stage with the University president or giving a prayer.”181  She knew 
that there was no requirement that she attend the ceremony.182 
The Seventh Circuit distinguished Lee by noting that during the Indiana 
ceremony “there was no coercion—real or otherwise—to participate.  Many 
 
 174. 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 175. See id. at 983 (“The ceremony consisted of the national anthem, a nonsectarian 
invocation, . . . the singing of the University’s song, and a nonsectarian benediction.”). 
 176. See id. at 984 (“In 1988 or 1989, [Professor Tanford] wrote the student newspaper 
urging the faculty and University community generally to boycott graduations because of the 
‘inappropriateness of having prayer.’”); id. (“Third-year law student MacDonald . . . stated that 
her conscience would be offended if there were an invocation and benediction in 1995.”); id. 
(“[Plaintiff Suess] . . . is of the Jewish faith and stated that he was offended by the giving of a 
nonsectarian invocation and benediction because it is a form of proselytizing although he said it 
would not have any effect on his personal religious beliefs.”); id. (“Urbanski was an 
undergraduate plaintiff [who] . . . [o]pposes graduation prayer because he believes there should be 
a separation between church and state in a public institution.  Prayer makes him uncomfortable.”). 
 177. See id. at 984 (discussing plaintiff Seuss’s reaction to the prayers). 
 178. Id. (noting that “the Commencement Ceremony would not affect the religious beliefs of 
those in attendance”); see also id. (noting Suess’s testimony that the ceremony “would not have 
any effect on his personal religious beliefs”); id. (noting Urbanski’s testimony that his “beliefs 
would not be impacted by the ceremony”); id. (noting that MacDonald testified that she “would 
be bothered if her daughter saw a religious figure on the stage with the University president or 
giving a prayer,” although there is no record of her saying that she feared her daughter’s religious 
beliefs would be altered by the prayers). 
 179. Tanford, 104 F.3d at 984. 
 180. Id. (explaining that she “was uncertain whether she would attend if there were an 
invocation and benediction”). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
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students chose not to attend the stadium exercises.  Others left during the 
invocation, then returned and exited before the benediction.”183  Still others 
remained seated during these orations.184  Certainly, the Lee Court had 
suggested that one of the reasons that the Providence practice violated 
constitutional guarantees was that it pressured dissenting students to participate 
or, at least, signify approval by standing respectfully during the invocation and 
benediction.185  Yet, the Lee Court had also implied that the Providence 
practice suffered from other constitutional infirmities as well.  For example, 
even bracketing whether individuals would feel compelled to participate, the 
state was engaging in problematic behavior by arranging to have a 
nonsectarian prayer offered at a state-sponsored event that some individuals 
would feel compelled to attend.186 
The Tanford court’s noting that some students chose not to attend the 
ceremony187 simply did not speak to whether others felt compelled to attend.  
The court itself seemed to recognize the possibility that some attendees did not 
favor the prayer recitation when noting that some attendees absented 
themselves from the ceremony and that others remained seated while these 
prayers were offered.188  Yet, insofar as Lee suggests that the state should not 
impose prayers on the unwilling at a public function, the fact that these people 
did not in addition feel forced to signify their approval of the prayers would 
hardly immunize the prayers from constitutional invalidation. 
One of the confusing aspects of Lee is illustrated in Tanford.  While the 
Lee Court made clear that the difficulty posed by the Providence policy was 
that students were being subjected to religious coercion,189 the Court failed to 
identify which of the coercive practices were constitutionally problematic, and 
it also failed to indicate which of the possible remedial steps would or even 
might be constitutionally adequate.  The Court implied that certain 
considerations were important but then failed to discuss some of the facts that 
would have been relevant had these considerations in fact been constitutionally 
significant.  For example, the Lee Court did not mention how many of the 
graduating students attended the ceremony.  Nor did the Court seem concerned 
about how many had involuntarily stood during the benediction and invocation 
or even whether the plaintiff had stood.  By not focusing on these factors, the 
Court might have been taken to mean that these issues were relatively 
unimportant, e.g., because an individual could not be forced to choose between 
 
 183. Id. at 985. 
 184. Tanford, 104 F.3d at 985. 
 185. See supra text accompanying note 137. 
 186. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 588–89. 
 187. Tanford, 104 F.3d at 985. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. 
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attending the graduation and avoiding unwanted prayers.  Or, the Court might 
have thought them important and simply assumed, for example, that the 
plaintiff had unwillingly stood.  But then the question would be whether there 
would have been no constitutional violation had no one felt compelled to 
signify approval of a practice of which she did not approve. 
Engel involved indirect coercion because the state put its seal of 
endorsement behind a particular nonsectarian prayer.190  If that were the kind 
of coercion making the practice in Lee unconstitutional, then focusing on 
whether Deborah Weisman felt coerced into falsely signifying approval was 
misleading, because the Providence practice would have been unconstitutional 
even had there been no danger that her standing respectfully would be 
misinterpreted.  However, if the real difficulty were that she was forced to 
express a position with which she disagreed, then the Indiana ceremony at 
issue in Tanford would not have involved forced speech. 
The Lee Court suggested that “in our society and in our culture high school 
graduation is one of life’s most significant occasions.”191  Yet, for at least some 
of those graduating from college or whose family members are graduating 
from college, college graduation is as significant as or more significant than 
high school graduation.  Some individuals feel more compelled to attend their 
own college graduation or that of a family member than they do the same 
person’s high school graduation. 
Individuals could attend their high school graduations without being 
present for the invocation and benediction, but the Lee Court implied that the 
Constitution forbade states from imposing such a choice: “It is a tenet of the 
First Amendment that the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his 
or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-
sponsored religious practice.”192  However, one could not tell from the Lee 
opinion whether presenting such a choice was prohibited because so few 
students would take advantage of it or, instead, because the state was precluded 
from imposing such a choice regardless of how many would exercise that 
option.  One infers that the Seventh Circuit adopted the former interpretation—
the Tanford court implied that there was no constitutional difficulty posed by 
the Indiana practice, because students could stay or leave as they chose and 
could stand or sit as they chose.193  It is a testament to the Lee Court’s failure 
to make clear what was driving the jurisprudence that it was allegedly 
explicating that one cannot tell whether the Seventh Circuit followed the Lee 
rationale or instead ignored it. 
 
 190. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962). 
 191. Lee, 505 U.S. at 595. 
 192. Id. at 596. 
 193. See supra text accompanying note 183. 
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The Seventh Circuit noted that the district court “found Lee to be 
inapplicable because these plaintiffs are adults rather than younger students 
requiring special solicitude,”194 and it agreed that Lee did not require 
invalidation of the Indiana ceremony, at least in part, because of the age of 
those attending.195  Yet, the Lee Court had recognized that graduations often 
involve family celebrations: “Graduation is a time for family and those closest 
to the student to celebrate success and express mutual wishes of gratitude and 
respect.”196  Families might involve the graduate’s parents, siblings, children, 
and extended family, among others.  When the graduation is from college or 
professional school, it would be even more likely that the graduate would have 
his or her children attending, as was illustrated in Tanford when one of the 
plaintiffs discussed her discomfort with having her child present for the 
religious exercise.197  Yet, this means that the constitutional concerns 
implicated when impressionable young people are present at a graduation are 
still implicated in the college and post-graduate setting, even if the children 
present are not themselves graduating but instead are the children, nephews 
and nieces, or any other family member of the graduates. 
The Lee Court downplayed the importance of the number of young and 
impressionable individuals who might be affected by a benediction or 
invocation, suggesting instead that the fact that most individuals would not be 
offended by an invocation would not immunize that prayer, given that there 
still might be some who would be offended or improperly influenced.  
Nonetheless, the Court did not explain whether it had some minimum number 
of objectors in mind that would trigger the constitutional protections.198  The 
Court seemed to recognize the issue: “We do not hold that every state action 
implicating religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive.  People 
may take offense at all manner of religious as well as nonreligious messages, 
but offense alone does not in every case show a violation.”199  However, the 
Court neither addressed nor even seemed interested in how many were 
adversely affected by the Providence ceremony. 
It is simply unclear whether the Court would say, for example, that 
including a benediction and invocation coerced those who were graduating but 
did not coerce family members who were attending.  While recognizing that 
graduations are important for family members too,200 the Court never explored 
 
 194. Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 195. See infra text accompanying note 201. 
 196. Lee, 505 U.S. at 595. 
 197. See supra text accompanying note 181. 
 198. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. 
 199. Id. at 597. 
 200. See id. at 595 (“Graduation is a time for family and those closest to the student to 
celebrate success and express mutual wishes of gratitude and respect, all to the end of impressing 
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whether there were constitutional implications if some of the invited guests had 
qualms about the prayers.  However, given the likelihood that there would be 
impressionable children present at graduations either because they were 
graduating or because they had a family member who was graduating, the Lee 
Court’s comments about the importance of not indoctrinating impressionable 
youth would seem to have implications for many kinds of graduations. 
Arguably, it might seem more of a burden for a graduating student than a 
guest with a small child to leave before the benediction could be offered.  
Perhaps the Court was thinking that the departure of a graduate before a prayer 
would be so obvious that it would signify disagreement, whereas a parent in 
the audience who left with a small child at such a time might be thought to be 
trying to find a bathroom rather than signifying disagreement.  Or, perhaps the 
Court was suggesting that the state should not have a hand in religiously 
educating impressionable young children whether they were there as guests or 
graduates.  The former but not the latter interpretation would offer support for 
Tanford, given the likelihood that there were children in the audience during 
the invocation and benediction. 
The Seventh Circuit focused on the graduates and seemed convinced that 
Lee did not require a different result, at least in part because of the ages of 
those graduating.201  It is simply unclear whether that court would have 
reached a different result had it also considered the ages of some of the guests, 
although there is reason to think that the court would have reached the same 
result anyway.  For example, the court commented, “[r]ather than being a 
violation of the Establishment Clause, [the invocation and benediction 
involved] ‘a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the 
people of this country.’”202  Yet, presumably, a mere acknowledgment of 
beliefs is permissible even when much younger individuals are involved.  
Further, the Tanford court believed that there was no constitutional problem 
posed “by virtue of the University’s selection of a cleric or its instruction to the 
cleric that his or her remarks should be unifying and uplifting,”203 whereas Lee 
had implied that the state attempt to ensure that the prayer would be 
 
upon the young person the role that it is his or her right and duty to assume in the community and 
all of its diverse parts.”). 
 201. See Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985–86 (7th Cir. 1997). 
[T]he mature stadium attendees were voluntarily present and free to ignore the cleric’s 
remarks.  Most remained seated.  Under these facts, in which the special concerns 
underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in Lee are absent, the district court correctly 
determined that Lee does not require the challenged practices to be struck down. 
Id.; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) (“University students . . . are less 
impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University’s 
policy is one of neutrality of religion.”). 
 202. Tanford, 104 F.3d at 986 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)). 
 203. Id.  
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inoffensive to most was constitutionally problematic.204  The Tanford court 
chose not to address how the addresses at issue there were any different from 
the addresses at issue in Lee, where the latter were obviously not viewed as 
mere acknowledgments.  That said, however, the Court denied certiorari when 
Tanford was appealed,205 which at the very least means that the Court refused 
to take advantage of an opportunity to make the jurisprudence much clearer. 
2. Chaudhuri 
Chaudhuri v. Tennessee206 involved a different challenge to graduation 
practices.  In this case, Dilip Chaudhuri, a tenured professor, challenged the 
Tennessee State University practice of having a nonsectarian prayer or moment 
of silence at graduation.207  The university provided minimal guidelines with 
respect to the contents of the prayers.208 
One of the points at issue was the degree to which the plaintiff was being 
coerced to attend the graduation.  He thought that he was required to attend 
university functions, even where prayer might be offered.209  However, the 
University said that he was mistaken,210 and that faculty participation was 
encouraged but not required.211  Further, the University made clear that no one 
had ever been penalized for failing to attend a graduation.212 
Yet, when the Sixth Circuit was analyzing Chaudhuri’s claim of coercion, 
the court did not address whether he had had a reasonable belief that he would 
be penalized for nonattendance.213  Given the lack of discussion in Lee 
regarding whether anyone actually misconstrued Weisman’s silently standing 
 
 204. Lee, 505 U.S. at 588. 
 205. Tanford v. Brand, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). 
 206. 130 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 207. Id. at 233 (“The question presented here is whether a nonsectarian prayer or moment of 
silence at a public university function violates the First Amendment.”). 
 208. Id. at 234 (“Such prayers were also offered by local religious leaders at the invitation of 
TSU.  The university did not review the prayers in advance and did not provide any guidelines for 
content, other than to request that the prayers be nonsectarian and that references to Jesus Christ 
be omitted.”). 
 209. Id. at 234–35 (“Dr. Chaudhuri asserted that as a TSU faculty member he was required to 
attend university functions at which prayers were offered.  His performance evaluations were 
based in part on a ‘university service’ component, and he maintained that this included 
participation in university events.”). 
 210. Id. at 235 (“The defendants responded that Dr. Chaudhuri was not required to attend the 
functions in question and did not receive lower scores for absenting himself.”). 
 211. Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 235 (“Faculty members were encouraged to attend certain 
university-wide events, according to the defendants, but were not required to do so.  Attendance 
was not monitored.”). 
 212. Id. (“The defendants represent that no employee of TSU—including Dr. Chaudhuri—has 
suffered any adverse consequences for failing to attend a university function of the sort with 
which we are concerned in this case.”). 
 213. See id. at 238–239. 
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during the benediction as approval,214 and Lee’s emphasis on the reasonable 
views of the dissenter,215 a discussion of whether Chaudhuri’s belief was 
reasonable was warranted.  For example, suppose that the University had never 
made clear that attendance was not required, and that the dissenters had 
wrongly but reasonably believed that it was.  In that case, that no one was 
penalized for failing to attend might not mean very much, because it may have 
been that only those with very good excuses ever missed graduation.216 
Chaudhuri highlights why Lee’s discussion of coercion needed to be more 
focused.  The Chaudhuri court noted that there was no risk that Chaudhuri’s 
religious views would be altered as a result of being present during these 
prayers.217  Yet, much of the Lee Court’s focus was on the offense rather than 
on the likelihood of a change in belief, and the steadfastness of the individual’s 
beliefs might be positively correlated with offense if his beliefs were being 
contradicted by the prayer being offered.  Insofar as Lee counsels against state 
promotion of religious views that contradict the beliefs of some of those 
present, Lee counsels against the constitutionality of the Tennessee State 
University practice. 
Citing Lee, the Sixth Circuit noted that Chaudhuri “may have found the 
prayers offensive, but that reaction, in and of itself, does not make them 
unconstitutional.”218  Regrettably, the court did not elaborate on what further 
would have been required or even would have sufficed for the prayer practice 
to be struck down.  Would it have mattered if the prayer had been more 
sectarian?219  If so, would that have been because there would then be a greater 
likelihood that more people would be offended or, instead, because the degree 
to which a particular individual would have felt offended would likely have 
been greater?  The passage cited in Lee—“People may take offense at all 
manner of religious as well as nonreligious messages, but offense alone does 
not in every case show a violation”220—had been immediately preceded by the 
Court’s noting, “[w]e do not hold that every state action implicating religion is 
 
 214. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.  577, 593 (1992). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Cf. Habel v. Indus. Dev. Auth., 400 S.E.2d 516, 519 (Va. 1991) (“The testimony of 
witnesses that some of these [attendance] policies were not enforced . . .  has little value because 
the instances of nonenforcement were not publicized to students or faculty.”). 
 217. Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 239 (“There was absolutely no risk that Dr. Chaudhuri—or any 
other unwilling adult listener—would be indoctrinated by exposure to the prayers.”). 
 218. Id. (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 597 (“People may take offense at all manner of religious as 
well as nonreligious messages, but offense alone does not in every case show a violation.”)). 
 219. Cf. Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(“On numerous occasions, the prayers offered by the invited clergy member made specific 
reference to Jesus by name.”). 
 220. Lee, 505 U.S. at 597. 
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invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive.”221  When both sentences are 
read together, the Court is suggesting that one person’s feeling offense may not 
render a practice unconstitutional, but that several people feeling offense 
might.  Thus, the Lee Court does not suggest that offense is irrelevant but 
merely that one individual’s feeling offended may not be, without more,  
enough to justify invalidation of a particular practice. 
Yet, even the qualification that one person’s being offended may not 
suffice for a finding of an Establishment Clause violation should be understood 
in light of the context in which it was offered.  The Lee Court did not name any 
other student in addition to Deborah who had been offended by the practice at 
issue.  Instead, the Court either assumed that they existed or that the offense to 
one student sufficed.222  Yet, it seems reasonable to assume that there were 
several dissenting individuals among the faculty, graduating students, and 
guests (including children) attending the Tennessee State University 
graduation. 
One of the reasons that the Lee Court worried about coercing younger 
children to attend primary and secondary school graduations where there 
would be graduation prayers223 was the fear that students would thereby have 
their religious beliefs changed.224  Were that the sole rationale, however, then it 
should not have mattered whether the young person was sitting quietly in her 
seat or, instead, was being asked to stand to signify her approval of something 
that she did not believe.  Rather, the focus should simply have been on whether 
the dissenting child had been coerced into being present at a state function 
where prayers would be offered.  Further, if the relevant issue is that 
government should not be shaping religious beliefs, then there should have 
been little or no analysis of whether dissenters would feel offense.  Individuals 
can feel offended even when there is no likelihood that the offending practice 
will cause a change of belief.225  Indeed, there was no discussion whatsoever of 
whether Deborah Weisman’s religious beliefs were likely to be changed by 
being exposed to the invocation and benediction. 
Not only might someone feel offended by prayers having no likelihood of 
changing her beliefs, but prayers might not cause offense even if they did have 
some likelihood of changing particular religious beliefs. The very 
impressionable child, for example, who may be quite open and have no fixed 
 
 221. Id. (emphasis added). 
 222. That the Court assumed that offense to one student sufficed is evident in their holding 
that “the conformity required of the student in this case was too high an exaction to withstand the 
test of the Establishment Clause.”  Id. at 598. 
 223. See id. at 592. 
 224. See supra text accompanying notes 114–17. 
 225. See supra text accompanying note 178 (noting that none of the plaintiffs in Tanford had 
suggested that the offending prayers would result in a change of belief). 
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opinions on a particular subject, would seem less likely to take offense were 
particular religious views presented even if there was a significant likelihood 
that exposure to those views would result in a change in religious beliefs. 
If the focus of concern was that children should not be coerced into 
signifying something that they do not believe, then the Lee Court should not 
have emphasized how impressionable young children are.  The state’s forcing 
someone to communicate something in which she does not believe is 
problematic, even if she is not at all impressionable and is steadfast in her 
religious beliefs. 
Some of the Lee analysis did not focus on whether the person was being 
coerced into communicating something that she did not believe, but, instead, 
on her being coerced into attending a state-sponsored event where she would 
be confronted by an unwelcome, religious message.226  But this is problematic 
for both children and adults.  If Chaudhuri’s belief that he was required to 
attend was reasonable, even if mistaken, then at least part of the Lee analysis 
suggests that the Tennessee State University practice violated constitutional 
guarantees.  The nonsectarian prayers that were offered privileged certain 
religious views over others, and Chaudhuri did not subscribe to the religious 
views contained in the prayer that he heard.227 
Presumably, the Lee Court mentioned these different aspects of the case 
because it believed that they all were problematic.  Yet, the Court never said 
that each of these state practices was precluded by the Establishment Clause.  
Nor did the Court identify which element or combination of elements, if 
present, would suffice for invalidation under the Establishment Clause.  But by 
failing to do so, the Court left lower courts with wide discretion to uphold state 
practices as long as one of the offending features in Lee was not present. 
In a subsequent case in the Sixth Circuit, Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland 
Board of Education,228 the court examined whether prayers beginning board of 
education meetings violated constitutional guarantees.229  The policy was 
challenged by a high school student230 and a teacher.231  The student “was 
‘shocked and surprised’ to hear a prayer at the opening of the board 
meeting,”232 and the teacher felt “humiliated, demeaned and physically coerced 
into attending and participating in [the] prayers,”233 although there was no 
testimony by either plaintiff that the prayers were likely to cause a change in 
 
 226. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 588–89. 
 227. Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The prayers did, to be sure, 
evoke a monotheistic tradition not shared by Hindus such as Dr. Chaudhuri.”). 
 228. 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 374. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Coles, 171 F.3d at 374. 
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religious belief.234  The teacher testified that he had to go to the board of 
education meeting early to make sure that he would get a seat and for that 
reason could not wait outside until after the prayer had been offered.235  The 
court at least implied that this pressure to get a seat sufficed to establish why 
he was compelled to be present for the religious activities whose exercise he 
found offensive.236 
The Coles court noted that younger children might be present at the 
meetings, such as those wishing to challenge a disciplinary action,237 and that 
at least one student sat on the board to offer board members a “student’s 
perspective.”238 The court offered its understanding of the prevailing 
jurisprudence: “two overriding principles can be discerned.  The first is that 
‘coercion’ of impressionable young minds is to be avoided, and the second is 
that the endorsement of religion is prohibited in the public schools context.”239 
This analysis of the jurisprudence suggests that the Establishment Clause 
bars both coercing young minds and endorsing religion in the public schools.  
Thus, the Coles court believed coercion sufficient but not necessary for a 
finding of an Establishment Clause violation.  Further, when interpreting the 
first prohibition, the court seemed to downplay the need to show that several 
children were being coerced before a violation would be found, noting that 
“the heightened review given to school-sponsored prayer does not turn on any 
particular children-to-adults ratio, above which prayers are prohibited, but 
below which they are constitutionally permissible.”240  The Coles court instead 
implied that the important consideration was the fact that young minds were 
being religiously influenced rather than that some threshold number of children 
had been influenced. 
Presumably, there were some, perhaps many, children attending the 
graduation ceremony at Tennessee State University, and if the presence of 
children at a state event including prayer is enough to invalidate the prayer, 
then one might have expected that the Coles court would have decided the case 
involving Dilip Chaudhuri differently.  Chaudhuri and Coles are in tension 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. The teacher, Gene Tracy, objected to the inclusion of prayer.  Id.  On one occasion, the 
board president responded to the objection by noting, “I want you to know, sir, that we have 
Christians within this organization.  We have Christians that participate in the schools and I feel 
that the moment that you kick prayer out of the school, the Lord walks out of the school.”  Id. 
 237. Id. at 383. 
 238. Coles, 171 F.3d at 383. 
 239. Id. at 379. 
 240. Id. at 382. 
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with each other.  Surprisingly, although they were decided within two years of 
each other and in the same circuit, Coles does not even mention Chaudhuri.241 
C. Student Initiation 
One of the issues raised in Chaudhuri was whether the state could be held 
responsible when some members of the audience spontaneously broke out in 
prayer during a moment of silence.242  The University claimed to have had no 
advance knowledge of what would happen.243  When the same “spontaneous” 
event occurred at the next graduation,244 the University again denied 
complicity.245  The Chaudhuri court suggested that the University had no 
obligation to prevent such private expressions.246 
Suppose that those private expressions of religion would be attributable to 
the state when they occurred the second, third, or fourth time if the University 
failed to take any preventive action.  Even so, it is not at all clear that the 
Chaudhuri court would have found that the practice failed to pass muster.  
After all, there had been no coercion involved—neither to attend247 nor to 
participate in the ceremony.248  Further, the court characterized the case as 
whether the Establishment Clause was violated by exposing an adult to a 
prayer that he found offensive,249 and the court did not believe such exposure 
constitutionally problematic.250 
 
 241. Chaudhuri was issued Nov. 18, 1997.  See Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 232 
(6th Cir. 1997).  Coles was issued March 18, 1999.  See Coles, 171 F.3d at 369. 
 242. Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 235 
The program for the May graduation exercises included a moment of silence.  On 
reaching that point in the program, the speaker asked everyone to rise and remain silent.  
The moment that followed proved less than silent.  Someone, or a group of people, began 
to recite the Lord’s Prayer aloud.  Many audience members joined in—spontaneously, by 
all accounts—and loud applause followed. 
Id. 
 243. Id. (“TSU officials say they had no advance knowledge of what was going to happen.”). 
 244. Id. (“Summer graduation exercises were scheduled for early August of 1993. . . . When 
Dr. Jones asked the audience to stand for a moment of silence, a portion of the audience again 
recited the Lord’s Prayer.”). 
 245. Id. (“TSU officials denied complicity in this incident as well.”). 
 246. Id. at 237 (“The Establishment Clause does not require TSU to silence an audience of 
private citizens.”). 
 247. Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 239 (“Faculty attendance at TSU functions is encouraged but not 
mandatory.  TSU has represented without contradiction that it does not monitor faculty 
attendance at the university events in question and that no faculty member has ever been 
penalized for non-attendance.”). 
 248. Id. (“Even if Dr. Chaudhuri had been obliged to attend these events, moreover, he would 
not have had to participate in the prayers or pay any attention to them.”). 
 249. See id. 
 250. Id. 
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The Chaudhuri analysis might have been more complicated had this been a 
primary or secondary school graduation.  However, as long as there is no state 
action when, for example, the prayers are initiated by a private party, even 
primary and secondary school graduations including prayer might seem 
immunized from constitutional review.  Courts in the different circuits have 
been forced to analyze a related issue, namely, whether student-initiated prayer 
at graduations is attributable to the state and thus should be examined in light 
of Establishment Clause guarantees. 
1. Jones I and II 
In Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District (Jones I),251 the Fifth 
Circuit considered a challenge to a school district’s permitting high school 
graduation ceremonies to include invocations and benedictions that had been 
composed and delivered by members of the graduating class.252  Some of these 
invocations had been overtly sectarian,253 although three weeks prior to trial 
the Clear Creek Board of Trustees had adopted a resolution specifying that: 
(1) the decision about whether to have an invocation or benediction at 
graduation would be left to the graduating seniors, “with the advice and 
counsel of the senior class principal;”254 (2) should the graduates decide to 
have an invocation and benediction, those addresses would be given by a 
student volunteer;255 (3) the invocation and benediction would be 
“nonsectarian” and “nonproselytizing.”256 
The court noted that “Clear Creek [i]ndisputably controls its 
commencement programs,”257 so the policy was not immunized from 
Establishment Clause review.258  The court then analyzed the policy in terms of 
the Lemon test.259  Finding that the inclusion of a benediction and invocation 
solemnified the occasion, the court held that the purpose prong of Lemon was 
 
 251. 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992). 
 252. Id. at 417. 
 253. Id. (“Pre-1986 Clear Lake graduation invocations included overt references to 
Christianity.  Clear Lake’s 1986 graduation invocation mentioned ‘Lord,’ ‘Gospel,’ ‘Amen,’ and 
God’s omnipotence.”). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Jones I, 930 F.2d at 417. 
 257. Id. at 418.  See also supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text (discussing Lee’s focus 
on the school’s control of the graduation ceremonies more generally). 
 258. Jones I, 930 F.2d at 418. (“The Resolution does not escape Establishment Clause 
scrutiny by only passively limiting students’ free choice of graduation speech content.”). 
 259. Id. at 419–23 (“The writer of this opinion is inclined to the opinion that present Supreme 
Court decisions require that the Resolution satisfy Lemon.”). 
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satisfied.260  The court rejected that the effect prong was violated, reasoning 
that “the students affected by the Resolution are the least impressionable 
people receiving special protection from religious inferences under the 
Supreme Court’s school prayer decisions.”261  After all, the court noted, the 
“graduation ceremony lies on the threshold of high school students’ transitions 
into adulthood, when religious sensibilities hardly constitute impressionable 
blank slates.”262  Finally, the court reasoned that there was no excessive 
entanglement, noting that Clear Creek “seeks to solemnize its graduation 
ceremonies in a manner most acceptable to all attendees, and in doing so may 
constitutionally pre-screen proposed invocations for sectarianism and 
proselytization.”263 
The opinion was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of 
Lee.264  In Jones II,265 the Fifth Circuit again considered whether the high 
school graduation practice violated constitutional guarantees, rejecting that Lee 
invalidated the local practice.266  The court read Lee as confirming that 
solemnization was a secular purpose,267 and it reasoned that an invocation or 
benediction could only “advance religion by increasing religious conviction 
among graduation attendees, which means attracting new believers or 
increasing the faith of the faithful.”268 Because the prayers were to be 
nonsectarian and nonproselytizing, the court did not believe that there was a 
substantial likelihood that the prayers would result in a change in religious 
views.269  The Fifth Circuit did not offer much discussion of whether its 
interpretation of “advancing religion” comported well with the kinds of 
Establishment Clause limitations recognized by the Court in the past.  For 
 
 260. Id. at 419–21 (“Because Clear Creek has a secular purpose for allowing invocations at its 
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matter of law.”). 
 261. Id. at 421. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Jones I, 930 F.2d at 423. 
 264. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 505 U.S. 1215 (1992) (“The judgment is 
vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for 
further consideration in light of Lee v. Weisman.”). 
 265. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 266. Id. at 965 (“Upon reconsideration, we hold that Lee does not render Clear Creek’s 
invocation policy unconstitutional, and again affirm the district court’s summary judgment in 
Clear Creek’s favor.”). 
 267. Id. at 967 (“[W]e take the Lee Court to agree with our holding in Jones I that a law may 
pass Lemon’s secular-purpose test by solemnizing public occasions, yet still be stricken as an 
unconstitutional establishment under another test mandated by the Court.” (citing Jones I, 930 
F.2d at 420)). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. (“Its requirement that any invocation be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing minimizes 
any such advancement of religion.”). 
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example, the prayer at issue in Engel270 did not seem likely to promote 
conversion or to increase the faith of the faithful, and the Court nonetheless 
suggested that this kind of religious activity271 implicated Establishment 
Clause concerns.  So, too, the prayers at issue in Lee272 did not seem likely to 
result in conversions or increases in faith. 
It is of course true that the New York and Providence practices were 
distinguishable in some ways from the Clear Creek practice.  The regents had 
designed the prayer in Engel, although the New York practice would have been 
prohibited even had the prayer been composed by a private individual.273  
 
 270. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962) (“Almighty God, we acknowledge our 
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our 
Country.”). 
 271. Id. at 424 (“There can, of course, be no doubt that New York’s program of daily 
classroom invocation of God’s blessings as prescribed in the Regents’ prayer is a religious 
activity.”). 
 272. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581–82 (1992) (holding that the prayers given at the 
public school graduation ceremony were religious exercises in which students could not be 
compelled to participate).  The prayers at issue in Lee were as follows:  
INVOCATION 
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave: 
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities 
are protected, we thank You.  May these young men and women grow up to enrich it. 
For the liberty of America, we thank You.  May these new graduates grow up to 
guard it. 
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate, for its 
court system where all may seek justice we thank You.  May those we honor this morning 
always turn to it in trust. 
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop 
Middle School so live that they might help to share it. 
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are our hope 
for the future, be richly fulfilled. 
AMEN 
BENEDICTION 
O God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for learning 
which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement. 
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important milestone. 
Send Your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who helped prepare them. 
The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future, help them to 
understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We must each strive 
to fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly. 
We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and allowing us to 
reach this special, happy occasion. 
AMEN 
Id. 
 273. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
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While the prayer in Lee had been written by the Rabbi, he had nonetheless 
been given guidelines.274  That said, however, Clear Creek had also imposed 
the requirement that the oration be nonsectarian and non-proselytizing.275  
While the practice at issue in Jones II is distinguishable from the practices at 
issue in Engel and Lee because the former would have permitted but not 
required a prayer whereas both of the latter required prayer,276 that difference 
does not speak to whether the prayers at issue would advance religion in the 
sense claimed to be relevant by the Jones II court. 
The Jones II court read Lee to stand for the proposition that 
unconstitutional coercion exists when the states direct religious activity and, 
further, require objectors to participate.277  The court noted that the resolution 
shifted the decision about whether to have an invocation from the state to the 
students278 and, by the same token, shifted the choice of speaker away from the 
state.279  Further, because the state did not offer a booklet to the speaker but 
instead merely directed that the oration be nonsectarian and non-proselytizing, 
the state had less control over the content of the benediction than had been true 
in Lee.280 
Consider a dissenting student who is deciding whether to attend the Clear 
Creek graduation.  She knows that a benediction and invocation will be offered 
as a result of the student vote.  At least one question is whether she would feel 
less coerced than, say, Deborah Weisman.  The Jones II court reasoned: 
We think that the graduation prayers permitted by the Resolution place less 
psychological pressure on students than the prayers at issue in Lee because all 
students, after having participated in the decision of whether prayers will be 
given, are aware that any prayers represent the will of their peers, who are less 
able to coerce participation than an authority figure from the state or clergy.281 
 
 274. Lee, 505 U.S. at 588. 
 275. Jones I, 930 F.2d 416, 417 (5th Cir. 1991), vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992). 
 276. Jones II, 977 F.2d 963, 968 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Unlike the policy at issue in Lee, it does 
not mandate a prayer. The Resolution does not even mandate an invocation; it merely permits one 
if the seniors so choose.”). 
 277. Id. at 970 (“Lee identifies unconstitutional coercion when (1) the government directs (2) 
a formal religious exercise (3) in such a way as to oblige the participation of objectors.”). 
 278. Id. (“The Resolution requires that the state not decide whether an invocation will occur; 
it respects the graduating class’s choice on the matter.”). 
 279. Id. at 971 (“In contrast, the Resolution explicitly precludes anyone but a student 
volunteer from delivering Clear Creek’s invocations.  Moreover, the Resolution says nothing of 
government involvement in the selection of the person who delivers any invocation.”). 
 280. See id. (“[T]he Resolution imposes two one-word restrictions ‘nonsectarian and 
nonproselytizing’ which enhance solemnization and minimize advancement of religion, instead of 
a pamphlet full of invocation suggestions.”). 
 281. Jones II, 977 F.3d at 971. 
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Yet, a student who was asked to stand for the benediction or invocation 
might feel even more pressure knowing that the prayer had been chosen 
through a popular vote.  In addition, the student would know that the state 
stood behind the prayer, at least in the sense that the state had officially 
adopted a policy whereby the majority could choose to have a prayer, minority 
wishes to the contrary notwithstanding.  According to the Jones II court, the 
Constitution permits the state to indirectly facilitate prayer at graduation 
ceremonies by delegating the decision to the student body: “The practical 
result of our decision, viewed in light of Lee, is that a majority of students can 
do what the State acting on its own cannot do to incorporate prayer in public 
high school graduation ceremonies.”282 
Suppose that the Clear Creek School District had good reason to believe 
that students would choose to have prayers at their graduation if given the 
opportunity to do so.  Permitting the majority to impose its will on the minority 
violates at least the spirit of Lee.  For example, the Lee Court rejected the 
legitimacy of the Providence high school’s producing a “prayer acceptable to 
most persons . . . [when it would] be used in a formal religious exercise which 
students, for all practical purposes, are obliged to attend.”283  While the school 
policy at issue in Jones II would make the prayer acceptable to many, it was 
nonetheless true that the prayer would be part of a formal religious exercise 
which students would feel pressure to attend.  If including the nonsectarian 
prayer at issue in Lee put dissenting students in a difficult position and forced 
them to make choices that they should not be forced to make, the same was 
true in Jones II. 
It is an empirical question whether the purpose behind the adoption of the 
Clear Creek policy was to make it possible for the school to continue to have 
prayers included in the graduation ceremony.  However, the fact that the policy 
was adopted shortly before the trial was to begin284 suggests that the district 
was engaging in tactical legal maneuvers so that a practice could be continued 
that otherwise would have to be stopped.285 
 
 282. Id. at 972. 
 283. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588–89 (1992) (emphasis added). 
 284. See supra notes 253–56 and accompanying text. 
 285. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850–51 (2005) (“We hold that the 
counties’ manifest objective may be dispositive of the constitutional enquiry, and that the 
development of the presentation should be considered when determining its purpose.”); cf. id. at 
850. 
Executives of two counties posted a version of the Ten Commandments on the walls of 
their courthouses.  After suits were filed charging violations of the Establishment Clause, 
the legislative body of each county adopted a resolution calling for a more extensive 
exhibit meant to show that the Commandments are Kentucky’s ‘precedent legal code.’  
The result in each instance was a modified display of the Commandments surrounded by 
texts containing religious references as their sole common element.  After changing 
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From the dissenting student’s perspective, the Providence and Clear Creek 
graduations might seem equally coercive.  Or, perhaps, the Clear Creek 
graduation would seem even more coercive because the prayers might have 
been inferred to have the stamp of approval of both the district and the 
majority of the graduating student body.  Further, the Lee Court emphasized 
the view of the reasonable dissenting student,286 and it would have been 
reasonable for the dissenting student to have believed her views in conflict 
with those of the state and those of the majority of the student body.  
Nonetheless, the Jones II court offered a possible reading of Lee.  It simply 
was not possible to tell whether Lee would have been decided the same way if 
the Providence policy had permitted students to vote on whether to have an 
invocation and benediction.  Further, when Jones II was appealed, the Court 
declined the opportunity to make clear the respects, if any, in which that court 
had misapprehended the relevant jurisprudence.287 
2. Black Horse 
Jones II might be contrasted with a Third Circuit decision, American Civil 
Liberties Union v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education.288  At issue 
in Black Horse was a school board policy permitting graduating students to 
decide whether their graduation would include: (1) prayer, (2) a moment of 
silence or reflection, or (3) neither.289  When prayer  received the most votes, 
the senior class officers chose the person who would deliver the prayer from 
among the students volunteering to do so.290  The ACLU challenged the policy 
shortly thereafter.291 
The Third Circuit noted that an “impermissible practice can not be 
transformed into a constitutionally acceptable one by putting a democratic 
 
counsel, the counties revised the exhibits again by eliminating some documents, 
expanding the text set out in another, and adding some new ones. 
Id. at 850 (citation omitted). 
 286. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing Lee’s focus on the perspective of 
the reasonable dissenter). 
 287. The Court denied certiorari when the Jones II opinion was appealed.  See Jones v. Clear 
Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 967 (1993).  Such a denial is not equivalent to an affirmance.  
See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 525 U.S. 943 (1998) (Stevens, 
J.) (“As I have pointed out on more than one occasion, the denial of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari is not a ruling on the merits.”).  Nonetheless, the point remains that the Court did not 
take the opportunity to correct any possible mistakes. 
 288. ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 289. Id. at 1475 (“The vote was taken the next day and produced the following results: 128 
students voted for prayer, 120 for reflection/moment of silence, and 20 voted to have neither.”). 
 290. Id. 
 291. The vote was taken on June 4, 1993, and the complaint was filed on June 18, 1993.  See 
id. 
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process to an improper use,”292 suggesting that the school district’s having 
permitted the students to vote on whether to have a graduation prayer would 
not immunize that practice from constitutional review.  The court understood 
that the policy before it differed from the policy at issue in Lee in that the state 
had not mandated a prayer but instead had merely permitted the students to 
vote whether to have a prayer,293 although the court also noted that the state 
still played a significant role in the graduation.294  Further, the court 
emphasized that the reason that the students were able to vote on whether they 
would have a prayer at graduation was that the school had permitted them to 
do so.295 
Taking its cue from Lee, the Black Horse court noted that the dissenting 
student would feel coerced at the Highland Regional High School 
graduation,296 just as she had in Lee.297  The Highland graduation would be 
supervised and controlled by the state,298 just as had been true in Lee.299  
Indeed, the Third Circuit suggested that one factor made the Highland 
graduation policy even more constitutionally objectionable than the Providence 
graduation, namely, the lack of control over the content of the prayer, which 
could be quite sectarian and proselytizing.300  The court cited with approval an 
analysis offered by a sister court: “We cannot allow the school district’s 
 
 292. Id. at 1477. 
 293. Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1479 (“It is, of course, true that the state’s entanglement with the 
graduation prayer in Lee was more obvious, pronounced, and intrusive than the School District’s 
involvement here.”). 
 294. Id. (“Graduation at Highland Regional High School, like graduation at nearly any other 
school, is a school sponsored event.  School officials decide the sequence of events and the order 
of speakers on the program, and ceremonies are typically held on school property at no cost to the 
students.”). 
 295. Id. (“Delegation of one aspect of the ceremony to a plurality of students does not 
constitute the absence of school officials’ control over the graduation.  Students decided the 
question of prayer at graduation only because school officials agreed to let them decide that one 
question.  Although the delegation here may appear to many to be no more than a neutral means 
of deciding whether prayer should be included in the graduation, it does not insulate the School 
Board from the reach of the First Amendment.”). 
 296. This was the name of the high school at issue.  See id. at 1475. 
 297. Id. at 1480 (“We find no difference whatsoever between the coercion in Lee and the 
coercion here.”). 
 298. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1478 (discussing the “control the administration retained 
over student speech at graduation”). 
 299. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (discussing “the school district’s 
supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony”). 
 300. Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1484–85 (“Version D permits a student to give a sectarian, 
proselytizing address.  If a student were to decide to give such an address after a student 
referendum ‘authorized’ verbal prayer, the administration could not halt it without violating its 
own policy.  If this were to occur, a proselytizing prayer (perhaps even degrading other religions) 
would be delivered in a forum controlled by the School Board.”). 
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delegate to make decisions that the school district cannot make.  When the 
senior class is given plenary power over a state-sponsored, state-controlled 
event such as high school graduation, it is just as constrained by the 
Constitution as the state would be.”301 
While the Black Horse majority struck down the policy,302 the Black Horse 
dissent should not be ignored.303  Judge Mansmann in dissent argued that Lee 
did “not preclude such student directed, composed and delivered prayer as an 
integral segment of the graduation ceremony, where there is not, by policy, 
virtually any school administration or faculty involvement.”304  Indeed, she 
went so far as to suggest that “none of the decisions made by the graduating 
class concerning graduation prayer can be attributed to the state and the 
Establishment Clause is therefore not even implicated.”305  While the majority 
had worried about the prospect of sectarian speech, she seemed to believe that 
possibility was a virtue of the Black Horse policy306 because that would mean 
that the state was imposing even fewer limitations on the speech.307  Finally, 
the dissent distinguished between the coercion felt by Weisman and the 
coercion that would be felt by the student who attended the Highland 
graduation: 
There could not be any confusion on the part of the reasonable graduating 
senior, who has been made aware of the senior class poll and has been invited 
to participate, with regard to whether the result of that poll represents an 
official opinion of the state or the will of the senior class.308 
Here, Judge Mansmann is not focused on whether the dissenting student 
feels coerced but on whether the student can reasonably feel coerced by the 
state.  Further, she suggests that it would not be reasonable for the dissenting 
student to feel coerced by the state merely because the state had made it 
 
 301. Id. at 1483 (citing Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1994), 
vacated, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995)). 
 302. Id. at 1474  (“For the reasons that follow we hold that this policy is inconsistent with the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Accordingly, we will affirm, but modify, the 
permanent injunction issued by the district court.”). 
 303. See id. at 1489–97 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
 304. See id. 
 305. Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1490 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
 306. Id. at 1492 (“By contrast, Black Horse’s policy for prayer at graduation ceremonies is 
more liberal in that it extends the scope of its toleration to include even sectarian prayer, if the 
graduates so choose.”). 
 307. See id. at 1475 (majority opinion) (“On June 9, Edward Ross, a member of the senior 
class, approached Principal Palatucci and requested that a representative from the ACLU also be 
permitted to speak at the graduation to discuss safe sex and condom distribution.  Principal 
Palatucci denied Ross’ request explaining that the time constraints of the ceremony would not 
permit a keynote speaker, and that the topic requested was not generally one discussed at 
graduation ceremonies.”). 
 308. Id. at 1492 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
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possible for the majority to vote for a sectarian, proselytizing prayer, although 
she never explains why that is so.  But for the district’s permitting the students 
to vote on whether to have a prayer, there would not have been a significant 
likelihood that she would be subjected to unwelcome prayer at her graduation. 
It might be argued that coercion should not be attributed to the state simply 
by virtue of the state’s having authorized the students to vote.  Were coercion 
attributable to the state merely because the state made prayer possible, then the 
state would seem to be responsible for the prayers said aloud during the 
moment of silence at the Tennessee State University graduation, even when 
that had never happened before.  Perhaps there should be some foreseeability 
threshold, for example, that there was a significant chance that there would be 
prayer or, perhaps, that prayer would be more likely than not included within 
the graduation ceremony.  However, no rationale was offered by the Black 
Horse dissent to explain why it would be reasonable to attribute coercion to the 
state when the state had required prayer but not reasonable merely because the 
state had adopted a policy whereby prayer was merely likely or, perhaps, very 
likely to occur.309 
One final point might be made about Black Horse.  While the majority 
decision captured the spirit of Lee more than Jones II did, the Black Horse 
dissent may prove to be a more accurate reflection of the position that the 
Court will ultimately take on this matter, if only because Supreme Court 
Justice Alito, who was then on the Third Circuit, joined Judge Mansmann’s 
dissent.310 
3. Doe 
At issue in Doe v. Madison School District (Doe I)311 was a school policy 
permitting a minimum of four students to speak at commencement.312  The 
students would be selected on the basis of class standing313 and could “choose 
to deliver ‘an address, poem, reading, song, musical presentation, prayer, or 
any other pronouncement.’”314  The school would not “censor any presentation 
or require any content.”315  It might offer advice about the appropriate 
language to be used for the occasion, but that advice could be rejected.316 
 
 309. See also infra notes 406–08 and accompanying text (offering an example of what 
presumably would qualify as a sufficiently high probability to warrant imputation to the state). 
 310. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1489 (Mansmann, J. dissenting). 
 311. Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321 (Doe I), 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998), reh’g granted, 
and opinion withdrawn, 165 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 312. See id. at 834. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Doe I, 147 F.3d at 834. 
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The plaintiff had challenged the policy on behalf of herself and her child as 
a violation of the Establishment Clause,317 claiming that “by allowing students 
to inject prayers and religious songs into the graduation program—the policy 
perpetuates a long-standing practice of officially sanctioned religious 
graduation ceremonies.”318  The Ninth Circuit understood that by permitting 
prayers the school district might be placing students in a coercive situation,319 
but it reasoned that the school’s having no control over the content of the 
oration made the case distinguishable from Lee.320  The court noted: 
First, students—not clergy—deliver the presentations.  Second, these student-
speakers are selected by academic performance, a purely neutral and secular 
criterion.  Third, once chosen, these individual students have autonomy over 
content; the school does not require the recitation of a prayer, but rather leaves 
it up to the student whether to deliver “an address, poem, reading, song, 
musical presentation, prayer, or any other pronouncement.321 
For support, the Doe I court pointed to Justice Souter’s Lee concurrence where 
he noted: 
If the State had chosen its graduation day speakers according to wholly secular 
criteria, and if one of those speakers (not a state actor) had individually chosen 
to deliver a religious message, it would have been harder to attribute an 
endorsement of religion to the State.322 
Yet, Justice Souter does not say that there could not be a finding of 
endorsement in his hypothetical scenario, but merely that it would be more 
difficult to so find.  A number of factors might be relevant when deciding 
whether there had been endorsement, e.g., whether this policy had been 
implemented so that a longstanding practice of having at least one prayer at 
graduation ceremonies could be maintained.323 
Suppose that Justice Souter’s hypothetical is modified and, in a particular 
year, all four of the students offered prayers.  Disclaimer in the program 
notwithstanding,324 this might not only feel coercive but also might reasonably 
be viewed as a state endorsement of religion. 
 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at 835 (“[O]ne of these facts—the pressures on a student to attend graduation and to 
conform with her peers—may well be present here.”). 
 320. Id. (“[T]he other fact—the significant control exerted by the school on the religious 
contents of the graduation program—is missing.”). 
 321. Doe I, 147 F.3d at 835. 
 322. Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring)). 
 323. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321 (Doe II), 177 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1999) (“On 
November 16, 1990, two families filed this action alleging that defendants’ longstanding policy 
of sponsoring prayers at their high school’s graduation ceremonies violated the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.”). 
 324. See Doe I, 147 F.3d at 837–38. 
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The Doe I opinion was withdrawn and replaced with a later opinion, Doe 
II,325 holding that the plaintiff did not have standing326 and mooting the 
decision below.327  However, variations of the problem posed in Doe I and Doe 
II came up in the circuits and continued to come up until the Court addressed 
how student elections of speakers should be handled in Santa Fe Independent 
School District v. Doe.328  In spite of this, Santa Fe, like Lee before it, 
probably raised as many questions as it answered. 
III.  THE COERCION TEST REFINED 
The Santa Fe Court made clear that a school’s permitting student elections 
to determine whether there would be a prayer at a state-sponsored event would 
not immunize the practice from review.329  However, the Court did not make 
clear what additional actions or non-actions by the state would preclude a 
finding that the offering of a prayer at a public function violated Establishment 
Clause guarantees.  These and other issues have been left to the lower courts to 
figure out, resulting in the foreseeably confusing and confused jurisprudence 
that governs the law in this area. 
A. Santa Fe 
At issue in Santa Fe was a high school policy authorizing two student 
elections, the first to determine whether there would be messages, statements, 
or invocations at football games and the second, if necessary, to determine the 
identity of the orator.330  The specific question before the Court was whether 
the local policy permitting student-initiated and student-led prayers at football 
games violated constitutional guarantees.331  In concluding that the policy 
violated the Establishment Clause,332 the Court suggested that the principles 
articulated in Lee governed the case,333 as if those principles were clear.  
 
 325. See Doe II, 177 F.3d at 789. 
 326. Id. at 799 (“In conclusion, the student-plaintiff’s graduation mooted the requests for 
injunctive and declaratory relief, and no mootness exception applies.”). 
 327. Id. (“Following the established practice in the federal system and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2106, we vacate the district court’s decision and direct the district court to dismiss the 
complaint.”). 
 328. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 329. See id. at 317. 
 330. See id. at 297–98. 
 331. Id. at 301 (“We granted the District’s petition for certiorari, limited to the following 
question: Whether petitioner’s policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football 
games violates the Establishment Clause.”). 
 332. See id. 
 333. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302 (“[O]ur analysis is properly guided by the principles that we 
endorsed in Lee.”). 
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However, a brief examination of the post-Lee student prayer cases in the 
circuits reveals that those principles were far from transparent.334 
The first question addressed by the Santa Fe Court was whether the speech 
at issue was public or private.335  The Court noted that the invocations were 
authorized by the school policy and took place at a state-sponsored event on 
state property.336  Further, one person would be chosen to deliver the message 
or invocation for the entire season,337 and that message was regulated with 
respect to subject matter and content.338  The Court explained that the “alleged 
‘circuit-breaker’ mechanism of the dual elections and student speaker do not 
turn public speech into private speech.”339  The Court also noted that this 
mechanism would not immunize the school policy from constitutional review 
when students were coerced into being present for unwelcome religious 
messages.340 
The Court analogized Santa Fe to Lee in a few different respects.  For 
example, while the school district had argued in Lee that its requiring 
nonsectarian prayers minimized the message’s coercive effect,341 the Lee Court 
responded that protecting the sensibilities of most people would not minimize 
and might even aggravate the dissenters’ feelings of isolation and affront.342  
So, too, the Santa Fe Court reasoned, while one student being chosen as the 
speaker at each of the football games “might ensure that most of the students 
are represented, it does nothing to protect the minority; indeed, it likely serves 
to intensify their offense.”343 
Of course, it was not as if the stated criterion for election involved the 
contents of the prayers or even whether the speaker would offer prayers.  
Instead, individuals might be chosen based on popularity, grades, or oratory 
skills.344  However, the Court examined the context in which this election took 
 
 334. See supra Part II.B–C. 
 335. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302. 
 336. Id.  (“[I]nvocations are authorized by a government policy and take place on government 
property at government-sponsored school-related events.”). 
 337. Id. at 303. 
 338. Id. (noting that the message was “subject to particular regulations that confine [its] 
content and topic”). 
 339. Id. at 310. 
 340. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 310 (“[T]hese mechanisms do not insulate the school from the 
coercive element of the final message.”). 
 341. See id. at 305 (“[I]ts policy of endorsing only ‘. . . nonsectarian’ prayer . . . minimized 
the intrusion on the audience as a whole.”). 
 342. See id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992)) (“[S]uch a majoritarian 
policy ‘does not lessen the offense or isolation to the objectors.  At best it narrows their number, 
at worst increases their sense of isolation and affront.’”). 
 343. Id. 
 344. See id. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“It is also possible that the election would 
not focus on prayer, but on public speaking ability or social popularity.”). 
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place—first, there was a decision about whether there would be an invocation 
or message, and second, assuming that the first vote yielded a positive 
response, an election to determine who would deliver the oration—and 
concluded that “the policy, by its terms, invites and encourages religious 
messages.”345 
One of the noteworthy aspects of the Santa Fe opinion was the way that it 
addressed the regulations regarding content and topic.  The message was “to 
solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to 
establish the appropriate environment for the competition.”346  But, the Court 
noted, “[a] religious message is the most obvious method of solemnizing an 
event.”347  Further, because the term “invocation” had always been used in the 
past to refer to a religious message,348 the Court reasoned that the policy 
encouraged and was understood by the students to encourage a religious 
message.349  Indeed, the Court noted that it was not clear “what type of 
message would be both appropriately ‘solemnizing’ under the District’s policy 
and yet nonreligious.”350 
Thus, Santa Fe was similar to Lee in that a religious message would be 
delivered and in that attendees were being coerced into attending.  While 
accepting that the pressure to attend a football game was not as great as the 
pressure to attend a graduation ceremony,351 the Santa Fe Court noted that 
there were some students—such as cheerleaders, band members, and members 
of the football team—who had to attend.352  Even bracketing those for whom 
attendance was required, the Court suggested that to “assert that high school 
students do not feel immense social pressure, or have a truly genuine desire, to 
be involved in the extracurricular event that is American high school football is 
‘formalistic in the extreme.’”353  For at least some students, “the choice 
between attending these games and avoiding personally offensive religious 
rituals is in no practical sense an easy one [and the] Constitution, moreover, 
demands that the school may not force this difficult choice upon these 
students.”354 
Suppose, however, that the choice to attend a football game was viewed as 
purely voluntary.  Even so, the Court reasoned, “the delivery of a pregame 
 
 345. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 306. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. at 307. 
 349. Id. (“[T]he expressed purposes of the policy encourage the selection of a religious 
message, and that is precisely how the students understand the policy.”). 
 350. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309. 
 351. Id. at 311. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992)). 
 354. Id. at 312. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
470 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:417 
prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act 
of religious worship.”355  The Court refused to “turn a blind eye to the context 
in which this policy arose, and that context quells any doubt that this policy 
was implemented with the purpose of endorsing school prayer.”356 
Part of what drove this decision may have been that there had already been 
allegations of proselytizing, and so it might have seemed eminently reasonable 
to expect that this mechanism would be used to engage in similar activity.357  
Yet, the Santa Fe Court did not rely on this factor, instead offering what might 
be viewed as a relatively forgiving standard for what would qualify as being 
too coercive.  After all, in Santa Fe, the students chose the speaker, whereas in 
Lee the speaker had been chosen by the school administration.  In Doe, the 
policy limitations on the content of the oration were designed to promote 
allegedly secular goals, whereas in Lee the policy limitations were to promote 
non-sectarianism, which nonetheless might be characterized as promoting 
religion over non-religion.358 
Santa Fe at least seemed to clear up some of the questions raised in Lee.  
For example, Santa Fe suggests that it is not necessary to show that the state is 
promoting certain religious views over others (e.g., nonsectarian rather than 
sectarian) for the state’s having had a hand in the content of an oration to 
trigger Establishment Clause guarantees.  However, it is unclear whether a 
state’s refusing to even speak to the content of an oration would immunize it 
from an Establishment Clause challenge.  On the one hand, it seems less 
plausible to argue that the state caused a religious message to be delivered if 
the state provided no content guidelines.  On the other hand, the state’s refusal 
to take an oversight role, especially where there was reason to believe that a 
religious message would be delivered, might be thought to contribute to the 
 
 355. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312. 
 356. Id. at 315. 
 357. Id. at 295. 
Respondents commenced this action in April 1995 and moved for a temporary restraining 
order to prevent the District from violating the Establishment Clause at the imminent 
graduation exercises.  In their complaint the Does alleged that the District had engaged in 
several proselytizing practices, such as promoting attendance at a Baptist revival meeting, 
encouraging membership in religious clubs, chastising children who held minority 
religious beliefs, and distributing Gideon Bibles on school premises.  They also alleged 
that the District allowed students to read Christian invocations and benedictions from the 
stage at graduation ceremonies, and to deliver overtly Christian prayers over the public 
address system at home football games. 
Id. 
 358. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“The First Amendment mandates 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.”).  
But see McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing 
“the demonstrably false principle that the government cannot favor religion over irreligion”). 
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degree to which the message delivered at a state-sponsored event might feel 
coercive. 
The Lee Court recognized that the state guidelines had involved “a good-
faith attempt by the school to ensure that the sectarianism which is so often the 
flashpoint for religious animosity be removed from the graduation 
ceremony,”359 and at least one of the purposes behind the adoption of the 
Establishment Clause was the reduction or prevention of religious strife.360  
Yet, interpreting the Establishment Clause to encourage states to have a hands-
off policy might have the perverse result that the Clause would make it more 
likely that there would be sectarian flashpoints for religious animosity.361 
The Santa Fe Court explained that the district could not disassociate itself 
from the message’s religious content,362 rejecting the district’s claim that it had 
“adopted a ‘hands-off’ approach” to the pregame message.363  The Court 
instead suggested that an examination of the context revealed that the “policy 
involve[d] both perceived and actual endorsement of religion.”364  The Court’s 
willingness to consider the realities of the situation (whether the policy was 
understood by the students to be a way of promoting prayer, even if the policy 
was structured in such a way as to give the district cover) suggests that the 
Court will look behind the policies adopted by school boards.  Santa Fe might 
be read to suggest that the Constitution does not permit the state to avoid 
 
 359. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992). 
 360. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 725 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In a 
society as religiously diverse as ours, the Court has recognized that we must rely on the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment to protect against religious strife.”); Lee, 505 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“The Founders of our Republic knew the fearsome potential of sectarian religious 
belief to generate civil dissension and civil strife.”); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640 (1978) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in the result) (recognizing that “a purpose of the Establishment Clause is 
to reduce or eliminate religious divisiveness or strife”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Preliminarily, I think it relevant to face up to the fact that it is far 
easier to agree on the purpose that underlies the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses than to obtain agreement on the standards that should govern their application. 
What is at stake as a matter of policy is preventing that kind and degree of government 
involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain 
a political system to the breaking point.”); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 254 (1968) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment’s prohibition against governmental establishment 
of religion was written on the assumption that state aid to religion and religious schools generates 
discord, disharmony, hatred, and strife among our people, and that any government that supplies 
such aids is to that extent a tyranny.”). 
 361. See supra notes 306–07 and accompanying text (discussing the Black Horse dissenting 
view that the school’s permitting a student to offer an address with sectarian content was 
preferable for Establishment Clause purposes). 
 362. Santa Fe v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000) (rejecting that the District had 
“divorce[d] itself from the religious content in the invocations”). 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. 
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Establishment Clause guarantees by adopting policies that foreseeably and 
actually result in students praying before large audiences at either public 
football games or graduations, even if those prayers are composed by 
individual students. 
Yet, Santa Fe might not be read so broadly.  There were various reasons to 
believe that the state was trying to promote prayer.  For example, at one point 
the district adopted a policy permitting only nonsectarian and non-
proselytizing prayer,365 but then subsequently removed that restriction.366  As if 
realizing that removal of this provision might make the policy more 
constitutionally vulnerable, the district also added a provision suggesting that if 
the latter policy were struck down, the former would automatically become 
effective.367 
The Court has not heard another case subsequent to Santa Fe in which the 
coercion test was used.  This has forced lower courts to interpret the current 
standard in light of Lee and Santa Fe.  As might not be surprising, the lower 
courts have come up with remarkably different conclusions about what the 
coercion test permits and prohibits. 
B. Adler 
Adler v. Duval County School Board  (Adler I)368 illustrates one possible 
reading of the effect or non-effect of Santa Fe.  The Eleventh Circuit decision 
involving school prayer was handed down before Santa Fe and then was 
vacated for reconsideration in light of that decision.369  The Eleventh Circuit’s 
reaffirmance of its prior decision in Adler II370 suggests that Santa Fe may 
have been less helpful than might originally have been supposed. 
At issue in Adler was whether a school policy permitting an elected 
graduating student to deliver an unrestricted message violated Establishment 
Clause guarantees.371  Emphasizing the importance of the distinction between 
 
 365. Id. at 295–96. 
 366. Id. at 297. 
 367. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 297. 
 368. 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated, 531 U.S. 801 (2000), reinstated, 250 F.3d 1330 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
 369. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 531 U.S. 801, 801 (2000) (“Judgment vacated, and case 
remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration 
in light of Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe.” (citation omitted)). 
 370. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler II), 250 F.3d 1330, 1342 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(“opinion and judgment reinstated”). 
 371. Adler I, 206 F.3d at 1073 (“The central issue presented is whether the Duval County 
school system’s policy of permitting a graduating student, elected by her class, to deliver an 
unrestricted message of her choice at the beginning and/or closing of graduation ceremonies is 
facially violative of the Establishment Clause.”). 
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public and private speech,372 the Eleventh Circuit suggested in Adler I that the 
“absence of state involvement in each of the central decisions—whether a 
graduation message will be delivered, who may speak, and what the content of 
the speech may be—insulates the School Board’s policy from constitutional 
infirmity on its face.”373 
The court compared what was before it with what had been at issue in Lee, 
noting that the state had “clearly directed a formal religious exercise—albeit in 
the form of a nonsectarian prayer—under such circumstances as to oblige the 
participation of many who objected.”374  In contrast, the Duval County School 
Board policy did not direct or establish anything.  Indeed, the “School Board 
and its agents have no control over who will draft the message (if there be any 
message at all) or what its content may be.”375 
The Adler I court did not characterize attendance at the graduation as 
voluntary.376  Rather, the court suggested that the “focus must be on whether 
the state has endorsed the message in an appreciable manner, which, when 
combined with the inherent nature of the graduation ceremony, obliges 
students to participate in a religious exercise.”377 
Yet, the Eleventh Circuit left out some information that at least might have 
seemed relevant.  For example, it did not mention that up until the time that the 
policy went into effect, graduations had begun and ended with a prayer.378  
Further, the policy specified that these messages were to be no longer than two 
minutes,379 a length of time well-suited for offering a prayer,380 although that 
time might of course be used for something other than a prayer.381 
 
 372. Id. at 1074 (“Establishment Clause jurisprudence calls for the difficult task of separating 
a student’s private message, which may be religious in character, from a state-sponsored religious 
message, protecting the former and prohibiting the latter.”). 
 373. Id. at 1075. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. at 1076. 
 376. Adler I, 206 F.3d at 1083 (“[w]e do not quarrel with the Court’s suggestion in Lee that 
students feel compelled to attend graduation”) (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593–97 
(1992)). 
 377. Id. (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 594). 
 378. Id. at 1092 (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (“Until the year the policy went into effect, Duval 
County high school graduations had opened and closed with a prayer.”). 
 379. Id. (“The policy also dictates that the opening and closing messages last no more than 
two minutes, further limiting the types of speech possible.”). 
 380. See Adler II, 250 F.3d 1330, 1350 (11th Cir. 2001) (Carnes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
board’s mandate that the student ‘message’ be no longer than two minutes comports nicely with 
the length of a good, short prayer.”). 
 381. See Adler I, 206 F.3d at 1083 (“While ten of the graduation messages delivered pursuant 
to the policy involved some sort of religious content, the other seven Duval County graduations 
either had no student message or a wholly secular message.”). 
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It might nonetheless be thought that there would be a telling difference 
between a student message and a religious oration offered by a clergyperson.  
For the latter, one might well be expected to stand, but for the former, one 
might well be sitting.  Yet, as the Adler I dissent points out, the audience might 
well be expected to stand during the student’s remarks.382  In short, the 
experience for non-adherents in a Duval County high school graduation would, 
in many important respects, be identical to the experience in the Lee 
graduation.  Indeed, with no limits imposed on the content of the oration in the 
Duval County high school graduation, it would be unsurprising were students 
to be standing during sectarian prayers, increasing the discomfort or offense 
for nonbelievers. 
Adler I was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for further 
consideration in light of Santa Fe.383  The Eleventh Circuit reconsidered the 
case384 but reached the same conclusion as it had before.385  This time, the 
Court denied certiorari.386 
On remand, the Adler II court distinguished between the “message” that 
was at issue387 and the “statement or invocation” at issue in Santa Fe,388 
although it is not at all clear why that difference was telling.389  Indeed, as 
recognized by the Adler II court,390 the policy at issue in Santa Fe had referred 
to statements, messages, or invocations.391 
The Adler II court explained that the message that would be articulated at 
the graduation would be private and could not reasonably be attributed to the 
state.392  This was an important finding, for it in effect immunized the oration 
 
 382. Id. at 1097 (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (“Often, students are required to remain silent or 
even stand for the ceremonies’ opening and closing messages.”). 
 383. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 531 U.S. 801, 801 (2000). 
 384. See Adler II, 250 F.3d at 1330. 
 385. Id. at 1332 (“Having carefully reviewed the Supreme Court’s opinion, and considered 
supplemental briefs from the parties and amici, we conclude that Santa Fe does not alter our 
previous en banc decision, and accordingly we reinstate that decision and the judgment in favor 
of Duval County.”). 
 386. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 534 U.S. 1065, 1065 (2001). 
 387. See Adler II, 250 F.3d at 1338. 
 388. See id. at 1336. 
 389. See id. at 1344 (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (“A second distinction is that the Santa Fe 
policy allowed students to vote whether to have a ‘statement or invocation,’ whereas the Duval 
policy allows students to vote whether to have a ‘message.’  This too is a distinction without a 
difference.”). 
 390. See id. at 1335. 
 391. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 298 (2000) (“The final policy 
(October policy) is essentially the same as the August policy, though it omits the word ‘prayer’ 
from its title, and refers to ‘messages’ and ‘statements’ as well as ‘invocations.’  It is the validity 
of that policy that is before us.”). 
 392. See Adler II, 250 F.3d at 1337. 
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from an Establishment Clause challenge.  Yet, Santa Fe had expressly rejected 
that the student election mechanism could immunize the state from the 
coercive effect of having a prayer at a state-sponsored event,393 and the lack of 
oversight with respect to the content of the oration at the Duval County high 
school gradation might make that speech especially offensive to dissenting 
students and guests.  Surprisingly, the Adler II court concluded that no 
reasonable person could attribute the graduation prayer to the state, when 
members of the Adler II dissent had done so394 and the Supreme Court had 
done so in Santa Fe in which a similarly non-restrictive policy was at issue.395 
The Adler II court emphasized that there were three secular purposes 
served by the school policy at issue.396  One of these purposes was to 
solemnize the event, although, as the Adler II court explained,397 the Santa Fe 
Court had worried that a religious message would be the most obvious way to 
solemnize an event.398  Yet, the Adler II court failed to mention two points: (1) 
Santa Fe had involved other allegedly secular goals, since the message was to 
“solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and 
to establish the appropriate environment for the competition,”399 and (2) the 
other goals articulated in Adler400 were to (a) afford “graduating students an 
opportunity to direct their own graduation ceremony by selecting a student 
speaker to express a message,”401 and (b) permit “student freedom of 
expression, whether the content of the expression takes a secular or religious 
form.”402  None of these goals speaks at all to the substance of the oration.  
Thus, the only goal articulated in Adler relevant to substance is to solemnify, 
which suggests a religious theme.  In contrast, some of the goals in Santa Fe 
 
Under the Duval County policy, if the senior class elects to have a message, the student 
elected to give that message is totally free and autonomous to say whatever he or she 
desires, without review or censorship by agents of the state or, for that matter, the student 
body.  No reasonable person attending a graduation could view that wholly unregulated 
message as one imposed by the state. 
Id. 
 393. See supra notes 339–40 and accompanying text. 
 394. See Adler II, 250 F.3d at 1343–44 (Kravitch, J., dissenting). 
 395. See supra notes 362–63 and accompanying text. 
 396. Adler II, 250 F.3d at 1342 (“[W]e identified three genuine secular purposes driving the 
policy; permitting solemnization of this seminal education experience is only one of those 
purposes.”). 
 397. See id. at 1337–38. 
 398. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000). 
 399. See id. at 306. 
 400. The Adler II court simply referred to the goals that were listed in the Adler I opinion.  
See Adler II, 250 F.3d at 1342 (citing Adler I, 206 F.3d 1070, 1085 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
 401. Adler I, 206 F.3d at 1085. 
 402. Id. 
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implicating substance, e.g., promoting good sportsmanship and safety, did not 
suggest religion at all. 
If one were asked to choose between the Santa Fe and Duval policies with 
respect to which of the two policies was more likely designed to promote 
prayer, one would likely have chosen the latter.  Not only does it specifically 
authorize religious speech when discussing the allegedly secular goal of 
promoting student expression,403 something that Wallace counsels against 
doing,404 but the policy memo had itself been entitled, “Graduation Prayers.”405 
The Adler II court noted that not every graduation under the policy 
included a religious message—only ten out of seventeen had done so.406  Of 
course, that is still a significant percentage,407 and it was the state’s adoption of 
the policy at issue that permitted a religious message in so many of the 
graduations.408 
Arguably, the Eleventh Circuit simply ignored Santa Fe when 
reconsidering its opinion.409  Nonetheless, the Court refused to grant certiorari 
to make clear the respects in which Adler II may have misunderstood the 
opinion,410 and Adler II offers an understanding of Establishment Clause 
guarantees that some on the Court presumably share.411  Further, as had been 
true in Lee, the Santa Fe Court did not make clear in its opinion which 
elements were necessary or sufficient for a finding of an Establishment Clause 
violation, and there were respects in which the cases before the Santa Fe Court 
and the Adler II court differed.  As would be expected, the Santa Fe Court’s 
lack of specificity on these issues has resulted in other courts offering a much 
different understanding of the relevant constitutional guarantees. 
 
 403. See supra note 402 and accompanying text. 
 404. See supra notes 33–39 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties posed for an 
Alabama statute creating a moment of silence for meditation or prayer). 
 405. See Adler II, 250 F.3d at 1345 (Kravitch, J., dissenting). 
 406. See id. at 1339 (“[I]n seven of the 17 instances reflected in the record, students voted for 
no message at all or for a student speaker who subsequently delivered an entirely secular 
message.”) (citing Adler I, 206 F.3d at 1083–84). 
 407. Id. at 1349 (Carnes, J., dissenting) (“Sixty percent is not perfection, but it is close 
enough for government work, and Duval County’s ‘Graduation Prayers’ policy is government 
work.”). 
 408. See id. at 1346 (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he very terms of the Duval policy belie any 
purpose other than that of increasing the probability that graduation ceremonies will include 
prayer.”). 
 409. See id. at 1344 (“Although the policy at issue in Santa Fe and the Duval policy are not 
identical, their few distinctions are without significant differences, such that the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Santa Fe compels the conclusion that the Duval policy also facially violates the 
Establishment Clause.”). 
 410. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 534 U.S. 1065, 1065 (2001). 
 411. See supra note 310 and accompanying text (noting that then-Judge Alito signed the 
Black Horse dissent). 
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C. The Ninth Circuit 
In Cole v. Oroville Union High School District,412 the Ninth Circuit 
examined a case in which it was claimed that the district had denied the 
freedom of speech rights of two students when those students had not been 
permitted to give sectarian speeches at their graduation.413  Per local policy, all 
student speeches (including the “spiritual invocation”414) were to be reviewed 
by the principal to make sure that they were neither offensive nor 
denominational.415  When the two students, Cole and Niemeyer, submitted 
their planned addresses, the principal rejected them as too sectarian.416 
The Cole court rejected the claim that district officials abridged the 
students’ rights to freedom of speech,417 reading Lee and Santa Fe to say that 
the Establishment Clause requires school officials to prohibit sectarian orations 
at graduation ceremonies.418  The Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that the 
orations would have been private speech because: 
the District authorized an invocation as part of the graduation ceremony held 
on District property, allowed only a student selected by a vote of his 
classmates to give an invocation and no doubt would have used a microphone 
or public address system to amplify the invocation to the audience at the 
graduation ceremony.419 
The court also worried that inclusion of a proselytizing speech at a graduation 
would have been coercive.420 
In Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified School District,421 the Ninth Circuit 
again considered whether a district had erred in censoring a high school 
graduation speech that would have been sectarian and proselytizing.422  The 
school rejected the suggestion that the school simply provide a disclaimer 
 
 412. 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000).  While the opinion was submitted on June 12, 2000, one 
week before Santa Fe was decided, the Ninth Circuit opinion was not filed until October 2, 2000. 
See id. and Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 520 U.S. 290, 290 (2000). 
 413. Cole, 228 F.3d at 1095. 
 414. See id. at 1096. 
 415. Id. 
 416. See id. 
 417. Id. at 1101. 
 418. Cole, 228 F.3d at 1101 (“[T]he District’s refusal to allow the students to deliver a 
sectarian speech or prayer as part of the graduation was necessary to avoid violating the 
Establishment Clause under the principles applied in Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe, and Lee v. Weisman.” (citations omitted)). 
 419. Id. at 1102. 
 420. See id. at 1104 (“Including Niemeyer’s sectarian, proselytizing speech as part of the 
graduation ceremony also would have constituted District coercion of attendance and 
participation in a religious practice because proselytizing, no less than prayer, is a religious 
practice.”). 
 421. 320 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 422. See id. at 980. 
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saying that the views articulated did not represent the district’s view.423  
Eventually, a compromise was reached whereby the proselytizing passages 
would be deleted from the speech but would be included in written copies that 
would be handed out just outside the graduation ceremony site.424  The 
Lassonde court found Cole controlling.425  The court further explained that 
even with a disclaimer, “permitting a proselytizing speech at a public school’s 
graduation ceremony would amount to coerced participation in a religious 
practice.”426 
The Ninth Circuit reads Santa Fe to require school officials to assure that 
graduation speeches are neither sectarian nor proselytizing, even if the students 
giving these speeches are selected on the basis of secular criteria.  In contrast, 
the Eleventh Circuit suggests that Santa Fe imposes no such requirement on 
school officials and that students selected on the basis of secular criteria have 
free rein to give as sectarian and proselytizing an address as they wish, as long 
as the state had no part in affecting the content of the message.427 
One of the issues dividing the circuits before Santa Fe was the role played 
by age in analyses of state-sponsored events where prayers were offered.  As 
should be no surprise, Santa Fe offered no clarification on that point, and there 
is as much confusion as ever about the appropriate analysis of that issue.  A 
Fourth Circuit case illustrates some of the points in contention. 
D. Mellen 
At issue in Mellen v. Bunting428 was whether a state-operated military 
college (Virginia Military Institute) could have a daily supper prayer composed 
by a state official.429  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether 
whether Marsh’s approval of legislative prayer implied that daily supper 
prayers were also constitutionally permissible.430  Because “the supper prayer 
[did] not share Marsh’s ‘unique history’”431 and because the Allegheny Court 
had implied that Marsh should be construed narrowly,432 the Mellen Court 
rejected that Marsh controlled here.433 
 
 423. Id. at 981. 
 424. See id. at 981–82. 
 425. Id. at 983. 
 426. Lassonde, 320 F.3d at 984. 
 427. See supra notes 347–91 and accompanying text. 
 428. 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 429. See id. at 360, 369 (noting that plaintiffs emphasized that “the supper prayer is composed 
by a state official (the VMI Post Chaplain) and that it is delivered on a daily basis at mealtime”). 
 430. See id. at 369–70. 
 431. Id. at 370. 
 432. See id. at 369 (“The Supreme Court has since emphasized that Marsh is applicable only 
in narrow circumstances.”); see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 
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That Marsh did not control meant that the practice at issue might be 
unconstitutional.  In its analysis of whether Establishment Clause guarantees 
had been violated, the Mellen court applied the coercion test,434 reading Lee 
and Santa Fe to stand for the proposition that “school officials may not, 
consistent with the Establishment Clause, compel students to participate in a 
religious activity.”435 
To determine whether students were being compelled to take part in a 
religious exercise, the court had to address at least two issues: (1) whether the 
practice at issue was a religious activity or exercise, and (2) whether students 
were being compelled to participate in that exercise.  The court did not spend 
long on the first issue.  While the prayers were nondenominational or, at least, 
cross-denominational,436 they were nonetheless prayers, notwithstanding the 
defendant’s argument at trial that the prayer was “merely a segment of a non-
religious ceremony.”437  The district court rejected that the practice at issue 
could be understood as secular,438 and the Fourth Circuit was similarly 
unpersuaded.439  The Court of Appeals did not suggest that VMI was trying to 
 
492 U.S 573, 602 (1989) (“In Marsh, the Court relied specifically on the fact that Congress 
authorized legislative prayer at the same time that it produced the Bill of Rights.”). 
 433. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 370. 
 434. Id. (noting that coercion has become a predominant concern in school prayer cases). 
 435. Id. at 371. 
 436. See Mellen v. Bunting, 181 F. Supp. 2d 619, 621 (W.D. Va. 2002), rev’d in part, 327 
F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003). 
In this case, Defendant has established the practice of offering a daily, mealtime prayer 
for the purpose of assisting the Institute’s cadets in developing their “spiritual dimension” 
by establishing in them “the habit of regular spiritual reflection” and by “exposing them” 
to a type of prayer commonly embraced by followers of the monotheistic faiths of 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
Id.; see also Mellen, 327 F.3d at 362. 
[T]he Post Chaplain, Colonel James S. Park, has composed a separate supper prayer for 
each day. Depending on the day, the prayer begins with “Almighty God,” “O God,” 
“Father God,” “Heavenly Father,” or “Sovereign God.”  As the district court recognized, 
“[e]ach day’s prayer is dedicated to giving thanks or asking for God’s blessing.”  The 
court also observed that “a prayer may thank God for the Institute, ask for God’s blessing 
on the Corps, or give thanks for the love and support of family and friends,” and that 
“each day’s prayer ends with the following invocation: ‘Now O God, we receive this food 
and share this meal together with thanksgiving.  Amen.’” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 437. Mellen, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 623. 
 438. See id. at 629 (“Simply put, drafting a prayer to conform with generic, religious norms 
does not make that prayer ‘secular.’”). 
 439. See Mellen, 327 F.3d at 373.  “Indeed, we have emphasized that ‘an act so intrinsically 
religious as prayer cannot meet, or at least would have difficulty meeting, the secular purpose 
prong of the Lemon test.’”  Id. (citing North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Foundation v. 
Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 1150 (4th Cir. 1991)).  “And we have also recognized the obvious, 
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privilege one religion but instead suggested that the school was prohibited 
from trying to promote religion over non-religion.440 
The analysis regarding whether the students were being coerced into 
attending or participating in these religious exercises was more extensive.  The 
Mellen court noted that upperclassmen were not required to eat at the mess 
hall,441 and thus it was not as if they would be punished were they not to eat 
there.  However, the dining options for upperclassmen were rather limited, and 
the meals at the mess hall were pre-paid.442  The court concluded that although 
the meals might technically be called voluntary, such a technicality could not 
save the policy from constitutional invalidation.443  Indeed, the court suggested 
that even were attendance more voluntary, the policy still would not have 
passed muster.444  Nonetheless, it might be noted, compliance did not involve 
bowing heads or reciting prayers but merely standing silently.445 
At least one issue was whether it should matter that those attending the 
meals were adults rather than schoolchildren,446 although Mellen presented 
unusual circumstances in that “VMI’s adversative method of education,” 
which emphasized the “detailed regulation of conduct,”447 made the cadets 
“uniquely susceptible to coercion.”448  The Mellen court concluded that 
“[b]ecause of VMI’s coercive atmosphere, the Establishment Clause precludes 
school officials from sponsoring an official prayer, even for mature adults.”449 
The Mellen district court suggested that the state was engaging in 
“religious indoctrination,”450 which would be especially worrisome in a school 
 
that recitation of a prayer ‘is undeniably religious and has, by its nature, both a religious purpose 
and effect.’”  Id. (citing Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018, 1020 (4th Cir. 1980)). 
 440. Id. at 375. 
 441. See id. at 361 n.3 (“Cadets (other than rats) do not technically have to eat in the mess 
hall”).  “Rats” are first year students. See id. at 361 (discussing VMI “entering cadets (known as 
‘rats’)”). 
 442. See id. at 361–62 n.3 (“Cadets (other than rats) do not technically have to eat in the mess 
hall, but the meals in the mess hall have been pre-paid, and a cadet’s only other food options are 
vending machines, eating with faculty, or ordering pizza.”). 
 443. Id. at 372 (“The technical ‘voluntariness’ of the supper prayer does not save it from its 
constitutional infirmities.”). 
 444. See Mellen, 327 F.3d at 372 n.9 (“Even if dining in the mess hall was truly voluntary, the 
First Amendment prohibits General Bunting from requiring religious objectors to alienate 
themselves from the VMI community in order to avoid a religious practice.”) (citing Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)). 
 445. Id. at 362. 
 446. Id. at 371 (“General Bunting . . . insists that VMI’s cadets are mature adults, who will 
not feel coerced to participate in the supper prayer.”). 
 447. Id. 
 448. Id. 
 449. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371–72. 
 450. Mellen v. Bunting, 181 F. Supp. 2d 619, 629 (W.D. Va. 2002). 
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using the “adversative method,”451 because the state might be thought to be 
attempting to instill particular religious views in vulnerable individuals.  
However, the district court also suggested that even if one bracketed the 
worries about religious indoctrination, the Establishment Clause bars the 
religious coercion of both children and adults.452 
The Fourth Circuit did not directly address whether religious coercion of 
adults as well as of children is barred.  In response to the claim that the cadets 
were mature adults who would not feel coerced to participate in the religious 
activity,453 the court noted that the cadets were uniquely susceptible because of 
the adversative system,454 which involved “a rigorous and punishing system of 
indoctrination.”455  The court also suggested that because “VMI’s cadets are 
plainly coerced into participating in a religious exercise . . . the Establishment 
Clause precludes school officials from sponsoring an official prayer, even for 
mature adults.”456 
The Fourth Circuit seemed to suggest that it was the coerced participation 
rather than the possible modification in belief that constituted the constitutional 
infraction so that, for example, there was no need to discuss the likelihood that 
the prayer would alter the cadets’ religious views.  Nonetheless, it was not 
entirely clear whether the Fourth Circuit was striking the policy because it 
might inculcate religious beliefs or, instead, might be offensive to those with 
different beliefs. 
By suggesting that the coercion of the cadets constituted the constitutional 
offense, the court was suggesting that adults as well as children are protected 
from coercion.  Yet, it was unclear whether that was so because the adversative 
method was making the adults comparable to children for these purposes or, 
perhaps, merely because the adversative method ratcheted up the pressure so 
that it was reasonable to believe that even adults would succumb to this 
amount of pressure and thus would be forcibly exposed to unwanted religious 
activity. 
The Fourth Circuit’s Mellen opinion captures the Lee-Santa Fe 
jurisprudence in at least two respects.  Not only did the court reach the right 
 
 451. Id. at 622 (noting the “‘adversative method,’ which emphasizes physical rigor, mental 
stress, absence of privacy, detailed regulation of behavior, and indoctrination of a strict moral 
code”). 
 452. See id. at 634 (“These cases do not, as Defendant suggests, create one Establishment 
Clause standard for children and a separate one for their parents. The protections afforded by the 
First Amendment are the same, regardless of the citizen’s status as a minor or an adult.”). 
 453. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371 (“[Defendant] insists that VMI’s cadets are mature adults, who 
will not feel coerced to participate in the supper prayer.”). 
 454. Id. (“Although VMI’s cadets are not children, in VMI’s educational system they are 
uniquely susceptible to coercion.”). 
 455. Id. at 361. 
 456. Id. at 371–72. 
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result, but it discussed the relevant kinds of considerations without giving any 
indication about which of these elements drove the decision.  For example, it is 
simply unclear whether a different state university could compose and require 
prayers at meals covered by a pre-paid plan. 
CONCLUSION 
Part of the difficulty in understanding the proper approach in the school 
prayer cases is that Lee and Santa Fe both emphasize the importance of 
making case-by-case determinations,457 and both fail to make clear what is 
either necessary or sufficient for a finding that the Establishment Clause has 
been violated (beyond the particular facts before the Court).  The Court has 
thus given the circuits great latitude in deciding when school prayer violates 
constitutional guarantees. 
While the Court has offered broad outlines of what is prohibited (e.g., the 
state cannot itself compose a prayer to be recited at a graduation involving 
primary or secondary school students), the circuits are reaching contradictory 
conclusions about what is permitted and what is not.  The Eleventh Circuit 
believes student elections go very far in immunizing sectarian orations at high 
school graduations as long as school authorities impose no restrictions on the 
content of the speeches, whereas the Ninth Circuit suggests that the 
Establishment Clause requires that such orations be nonsectarian and non-
proselytizing. 
While it is clear that the age of those hearing the orations is relevant, the 
Court has not made clear why this is so.  If it is because young children are 
more likely to have their religious views changed, then the Court should not 
focus on whether such children are coerced into appearing to pray or actually 
praying.  Rather, the Court should simply suggest that the state should not 
facilitate the presence of prayer where young children are present.  If age is 
relevant because children are more likely to succumb to pressure to signify 
what they do not believe, then the discussion of the malleability of children is 
misplaced.  Rather, the Court should simply focus on forced speech issues. 
Regardless of why age is important, the Court should explain which group 
is the proper focus of concern.  The Court never explains, for example, 
whether at a graduation the constitutional focus is on the dissenting graduates 
who are being unwillingly subjected to prayer or, instead, on all dissenting 
 
 457. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) (“Our jurisprudence in this area is of 
necessity one of line-drawing.”); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000) 
(“Whether a government activity violates the Establishment Clause is ‘in large part a legal 
question to be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts. . . . Every 
government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances. . . .’” (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 693–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring))). 
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individuals who might reasonably feel pressured to attend, including 
employees and friends and family of the graduates, young and old. 
The Court focuses on offense but does not explain how many or what kind 
of people must be offended for Establishment Clause guarantees to have been 
violated.  Both adults and children might be offended if their religious 
convictions are being challenged at a public graduation, and the Court never 
explains why offense to children is more constitutionally problematic than 
offense to adults.  Nonetheless, the Court does not focus on the religious 
offense to adults, even though there presumably would have been adults who 
might have felt offended by the prayers at both the graduation ceremony at 
issue in Lee and the pre-game address at issue in Santa Fe. 
The Court focuses on coercion but never explains whether the coercion at 
issue is to attend the event or participate in the prayer.  For example, in both 
Lee and Santa Fe, the Court does not even discuss whether the plaintiffs had 
“participated,” and one simply cannot tell whether this was an oversight or 
instead meant that the coerced attendance was the constitutionally significant 
feature of the cases. 
Much of the prayer jurisprudence involves state participation in the 
composition or presentation of prayers at school ceremonies.  But the Court 
never explains whether a truly “hands-off” policy immunizes the state.  Nor 
does the Court explain or even suggest what the state should or must do if it is 
not to have prayer imputed to it. 
Perhaps all of these factors are relevant.  Even if that is so, the Court 
should explain whether the presence of one, some, or all is either necessary or 
sufficient for a finding of a violation of Establishment Clause guarantees.  
Circuits are left with so much discretion that the jurisprudence cannot help but 
lay in hopeless disarray. 
The Court’s willingness to consider context is to be applauded.  
Nonetheless, the Court must offer clearer guidelines with respect to what the 
Establishment Clause prohibits and permits.  As currently described, it is 
impossible to know whether the coercion test is very forgiving, very 
demanding, or somewhere in between.  Nor is it clear whether coercion is a 
necessary or a sufficient condition for a finding that Establishment Clause 
guarantees have been violated.  The lack of clarity on these issues has led to an 
intolerably high level of confusion and disagreement in the circuits, which will 
only be intensified unless the Court is much clearer about both what the test 
permits and what it is designed to discourage.  In a nation with so many 
religions represented in the public schools, it is simply unconscionable for the 
Court to offer such a confused and confusing jurisprudence with respect to 
prayer at state-sponsored events. 
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